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Is Land Special?
The Unjustified Preference for
Landownership in Regulatory Takings
Law
Eduardo Mois~s Pehalver*

This article critiques the Court's attempt to cabin the Lucas "per se"
takings rule by limiting it to real property. It argues that the distinction
between real and personal property cannot be justified by history or the
differing expectations of property owners. It then applies five theoretical
frameworks (libertarian, personhood, utilitarian, public choice, and
Thomistic-Aristotelian natural law) and finds that none of them supports
the jurisprudentialdistinction between real and personal property. As a
result, the article argues that "because the distinction between personal and
real property is an unprincipled one, it cannot save the Court from the
unpalatable implications of its Lucas holding for broader economic
legislation." While acknowledging the rationalefor the Court's attempt to
create a bright line rule in the area of regulatory takings, Pehalver
concludes that this is an area of law that is "unsuitablefor such inflexible
standards."
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INTRODUCTION

Scholars have widely condemned the Supreme Court's approach to
regulatory takings as a massive (and growing) swamp of muddled
contradictions.' Some critics of the Court's regulatory takings
jurisprudence blame the confusion on shifting coalitions within the Court,

1. See, e.g., Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Commentary, Euclid Lives: The
Survival of ProgressiveJurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2158-74 (2002); Carol M. Rose,
Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 561-62
(1984); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1077-97 (1993).
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which have yielded a series of deeply divided decisions pointing in
different (and at times, irreconcilable) directions.2 But criticism has also
centered on the Court's frequent reiteration, epitomized by its decision in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,3 of an ad hoc

approach in this area.4 Bruce Ackerman has called the repeated
invocation of this ad hoc standard a "parody of stare decisis."' And Susan

Rose-Ackerman has argued that any bright line would be preferable to
the Court's tendency toward "ad hocery" in regulatory takings.6 "[T]his is
one legal area," she claims, "in which almost any consistent, publicly
articulated approach is better than none. Clear statement, even if not
backed by clear thinking, will do much to preserve the investment-backed
expectations the Court talks so much about."7

Commentators usually cite the Court's decision in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council' as a prime example of the Court's efforts to
create clarity out of murkiness.' In that case, the Court held that-with

certain crucial exceptions-a regulation "takes" an owner's land when it
renders that land valueless."° The fairness of bright line rules in the
regulatory takings context, however, has been questioned." Moreover, as
2 See Haar & Wolf, supra note 1, at 2169-72.
3. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
4. As the Court has often put it, its "regulatory takings jurisprudence.., is characterized
by essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, designed to allow careful examination and weighing of all
the relevant circumstances." Tahoe-Sierra Pres.Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg' Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 235 n.2 (1977).
6. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1701-02,1711 (1988).
7. Id.
8. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
9. See F. Patrick Hubbard, Palazzolo, Lucas, and Penn CentraL" The Need for Pragmatism,
Symbolism, and Ad Hoc Balancing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 465, 479-80 (2001); see also Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial
Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 327-28 (1993) (suggesting that Lucas constitutes a
move towards a "law of rules" position in regulatory takings law); Frank Michelman, Takings,
1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1622 (1988) (characterizing the Court's 1987 regulatory takings
decisions as reflecting a desire to move away from an ad hoc balancing approach and towards a
"reformaliz[ed]," rule-based approach). Other examples of per se takings tests include: Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (regulation that "abolishes both descent and devise" of interests
in land is a taking); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982)
(regulation that works a "permanent physical occupation of real property" is always a taking);
and Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (government action that Court
deemed to constitute a deprivation of the "right to exclude" others from entering one's property
constitutes a taking).
10. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015, 1027 (regulation that deprives an owner of "all
economically beneficial or productive use" of land is per se a taking).
11. See id. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the unfairness of creating a per se rule
for people who lose one hundred precent of the value of their property when such people are,
for all practical purposes, similarly situated to many people-for example, those whose property
loses only slightly less than one hundred percent of its value-who will not fall within the scope
of the rule); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 442-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("If the Court's decisions
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numerous scholars have observed, the predictability created by Lucas is
debatable, at least in part because of the exceptions the Lucas Court
wrote into its per se rule.'
Most of the discussion about those exceptions has focused on the
Court's statement that a regulation is not a "taking," even when it
deprives an owner of "all economically beneficial use," if the regulation
simply prohibits the owner from doing something forbidden by
"background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance.""
While scholars have discussed this "background principles" exception at
length, Lucas created another, even more sweeping, exception that has
attracted far less scholarly attention. Citing Andrus v. Allard, 4 the Lucas
Court indicated in dicta that it understood its new per se rule to apply
only to property in land, effectively carving out an exception for
''personal property" whose value has been completely destroyed by
regulation:
[lIn the case of personal property, by reason of the State's
traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings, [the
owner] ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might
even render his property economically worthless (at least if the
property's only economically productive use is sale or manufacture
for sale). See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1979 (prohibition
on sale of eagle feathers). In the case of land, however, we think the
notion pressed by the [South Carolina Coastal] Council that title is
somehow held subject to the 'implied limitation' that the State may
subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent
with the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has
become part of our constitutional culture.15
This strong distinction in Lucas between land and other forms of
property made explicit a general favoritism toward land that had been
latent in the Court's modern expansion of the regulatory takings
construing the Takings Clause state anything clearly, it is that '[there] is no set formula to
determine where regulation ends and taking begins."' (quoting Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
12. See Hubbard, supra note 9, at 480-93; Richard J. Lazarus, Puttingthe Correct "Spin" on
Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1412 (1993); Glenn P. Sugameli, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council: The Categoricaland Other "Exceptions" to Liability for Fifth Amendment Takings of
Private Property FarOutweigh the "Rule", 29 ENVTL. L. 939, 940-41 (1999).

13. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029; see, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 9, at 499-507 (discussing the
scope of the "background principles" exception in Lucas): Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1091-94
("Lucas begins by telling judges why traditional nuisance reasoning is unworkable in takings law,

and it ends by telling them that they must apply only traditional nuisance reasoning when they
decide total-loss takings cases."); Lazarus, supra note 12, at 1426-27 (calling the Court's resort to
the "background principles" exception a "shell game" that had the potential to drain the Court's
holding of any force); Sugameli, supra note 12, at 957-77 (discussing the complexities of the

"background principles" exception).
14. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
15. 505 U.S. at 1027-28.
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doctrine. 6 Commentators have long noted this implicit preference.

7

As

Molly McUsic has observed, although the Supreme Court has not limited
its regulatory takings doctrine to land, its regulatory takings decisions as a
whole have "greatly favored that notion of property."'" J. Peter Byrne
agrees, arguing that "the Supreme Court has shown absolutely no interest
in applying the regulatory takings doctrine to assets other than land."' 9
The Court has never held, and this Article does not assert, that the
regulatory takings doctrine never applies to personal property. But it is
almost beyond dispute that, during its revival of the regulatory takings
doctrine over the past two decades, the Court has focused
overwhelmingly on regulations affecting land and that landowners
bringing regulatory takings claims stand a greater chance of prevailing in
the Supreme Court than the owners of other sorts of property."

16. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of Regulatory Takings
Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89 (1995); Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner. Modern Takings
Doctrineand Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 647, 653 (1996).
18. McUsic, supra note 17, at 653 ("[T]he Court gives little consideration under the
Takings Clause to purely economic regulations that do not affect land, even when large amounts
of wealth are at stake.").
19. Byrne, supra note 17, at 127.
20. See id.; see also McUsic, supra note 17, at 653. Indeed, the vast majority of regulatory
takings cases in which plaintiffs have prevailed in the Supreme Court have involved suits by
landowners. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 611 (2001) (land-based claim
prevailing in the Supreme Court); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526
U.S. 687, 693-94 (1999) (same); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 730-31
(1997) (same); Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997) (same); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 377 (1994) (same); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07 (same); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825, 827 (1987) (same); First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1987) (same); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 709-10 (1987)
(same); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421-22 (1982) (same);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (same). In contrast, only a handful of
plaintiffs asserting takings arguments related to property other than land have seen those
arguments prevail in the Supreme Court. See Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 990,
997 (1984) (owner of trade secrets); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 162-63 (1998)
(plaintiff asserting taking of interest in bank accounts); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 156-57 (1980) (same). Indeed, it is debatable whether Phillips and
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacieseven qualify as "regulatory takings" cases. In both cases, the Court
confronted state actions directly appropriating interest earned on bank accounts. See Phillips,
524 U.S. at 167, 171 (describing Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies as involving "confiscatory
regulations" and suggesting that the statute at issue in Phillips "confiscat[ed]" the plaintiff's
"interest income"). But see Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 159 (characterizing the
statute at issue as a "appropriation" of the power of the account's principal to earn interest for a
period of time). If the state actions in those cases were viewed as "confiscations" of the interest
(as opposed to regulation of the principal), the cases would more properly be categorized as
involving direct, as opposed to regulatory, takings. Similarly, in Monsanto, the Court considered
a claim brought by a trade-secret owner alleging that the government's use or disclosure of the
information covered by that trade secret would deprive it of property. In holding in favor of the
property-owner, the Court noted that
[w]ith respect to a trade secret, the right to exclude others is central to the very
definition of the property interest. Once the data that constitute a trade secret are
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At first glance, such favoritism towards property in land seems to
resonate with widely-shared intuitions about the importance of
landownership, particularly in light of land's apparently central role in the
achievement of the "American Dream" of homeownership.2'
Nevertheless, scholars who have discussed the Court's favoritism towards
landownership in the context of regulatory takings have often dismissed
its cogency out of hand. In his treatise on regulatory takings, for example,
Steven Eagle argues that the "implication that 'personal property' should
have less protection than land under regulatory takings doctrine flies in
the face of long precedent that both tangible and intangible personalty
are as subject to condemnation as realty."22 Most other commentators to

consider the issue-though not all1 3-have concurred in this assessment.24
The judicial response to the Lucas distinction between personal property
and land has been more mixed.25 While several lower courts have
embraced the Supreme Court's distinction, others have rejected it, and
instead applied the Lucas diminution-in-value test to claims asserting
takings of personal property. 2 Despite the discussion and application of
the preference, no court or commentator has fully explored the

disclosed to others, or others are allowed to use those data, the holder of the trade
secret has lost his property interest in the data.
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1012. Thus, Monsanto is a case in which the government conduct in
question was the functional equivalent of a direct appropriation of the entire piece of property,
as opposed to a mere regulation of that property. Finally, in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524
U.S. 498 (1998), a case involving pension benefits, the Court, though ultimately ruling in favor of
the plaintiff asserting that its money was "taken" by the regulations in question, was unable to
muster a majority in support of the plaintiff's Takings Clause arguments. See infra note 309.
21. See infra Part III.A.2.
22. STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 88 (2d ed. 2001).
23. Michael Allan Wolf defends a distinction between land and personal property within
regulatory takings by focusing largely on money. See Michael Allan Wolf, Taking Regulatory
Takings Personally: 1he Perilsof (Mis)Reasoning by Analogy, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1355, 1361-62
(2000). Takings of money, however, raise their own set of complications. Specifically, it is not
clear how to distinguish such "takings" from clearly permissible government interference with
property rights, such as taxes. This Article does not discuss the broader question whether it
makes sense for the Court to grant more (or less) scrutiny under the Takings Clause to certain
narrow categories of property.
24. See Fred P. Bosselman, Land as a Privileged Form of Property, in TAKINGS: LANDDEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFrER DOLAN AND LUCAS 29
(ABA 1996); Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1151-52; Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the
Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1433, 1441 n.48 (1993) (calling the Lucas Court's distinction between personal property and land
"one of the opinion's least artful efforts"); Sugameli, supra note 12, at 985-87.
25. See infra Part I.C.
26. Compare Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir. 2002) (refusing to apply
Lucas to personal property), with Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (rejecting the government's argument that "the concept of a categorical taking cannot be
extended to regulations that restrict the use of personal property").
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distinction as a conceptual or normative matter." In light of the persistent
and deeply rooted nature of the preference for land in the Court's
modern takings revival, a thorough analysis of the preferred status of
land within regulatory takings doctrine is overdue.
This Article undertakes such an exploration. Part I discusses the law
of regulatory takings as it touches on the preferred status of land. Part II
explores whether, as the Lucas Court claimed, the distinction between
land and personal property can be justified on the basis of history or the
differing expectations of owners of land and personal property. This
Article ultimately concludes that neither of these factors can carry the
weight the Court wants to place on them.
Given the failure of the Court's proffered explanations, Part III
discusses a variety of alternative grounds for the Court's distinction,
assessing it from the point of view of five theories within the scholarship
of property and takings: libertarian theory; 8 personhood theory;
utilitarian theory, particularly that set forth in Michelman's classic article
on regulatory takings; 29 public choice theory; and Thomistic-Aristotelian
natural law theory. Importantly, none of these normative frameworks
justifies categorically favoring landownership over ownership of personal
property in the regulatory takings context. Any intuitions that
landownership is somehow more fundamental than ownership of other
forms of property thus appear to rest on unreflective assumptions about
the importance of land, assumptions that, even if once true, are no longer
justified in our modern, post-industrial society.
Based on the analysis in Part III, Part IV concludes that, because the
Court's favoritism toward land is an unprincipled one, it cannot save the
Court from the unpalatable implications of its Lucas holding for broader
economic legislation. Instead, the Court's apparent discomfort with those
implications is reason to question the wisdom of the Lucas approach to
regulatory takings. Indeed, to the extent that the modern Court's entire
regulatory takings project has been made more palatable by its relatively
narrow focus on land, the dubious basis of the distinction calls into
question the soundness of that project as a whole.

27. In his interesting article on the Lucas Court's distinction, Bosselman approaches the
issue from a largely historical perspective. See Bosselman, supra note 24.
28. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY & THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985); cf ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).

29. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
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THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERSONAL PROPERTY AND LAND WITHIN THE

SUPREME COURT'S RECENT REGULATORY TAKINGS REVIVAL

A.

The Implicit Distinction between PersonalProperty and Land Before
Lucas

The Court's statement in Lucas that personal property is entitled to
less protection under the Takings Clause30than land simply made explicit
a longstanding tendency of the modern Court to give more credence to
claims asserting regulatory takings of land than claims involving personal
property.3 The different outcomes reached in Hodel v. Irving2 and
Andrus v. Allard33 present an example of this tendency. Without relying
on some sort of distinction between the protections afforded to land and
to personal property, it is very difficult to reconcile the two cases.
In Andrus v. Allard, the Court upheld, against a Takings Clause
challenge, environmental regulations that prohibited the sale of eagle
parts. Owners of Native American artifacts containing eagle parts, who,
as a consequence of the regulations, could no longer sell them, alleged
that the regulations constituted a taking of their property without
compensation.34 The Court rejected their claims." It observed that the
challenged regulations "do not compel the surrender of the artifacts, and
there is no physical invasion or restraint upon them."36 Although it
acknowledged that the regulations "prevent[] the most profitable use" of
the artifacts, the Court argued that "the loss of future profitsunaccompanied by any physical restriction-provides a slender reed upon
which to rest a takings claim."'" The Court emphasized that the plaintiffs
could still use the artifacts for purposes other than sale.38 Citing several
prohibition era cases, the Court noted that "[r]egulations that bar trade in
certain goods have been upheld against claims of unconstitutional
taking."39 It therefore held that no regulatory taking of property had
occurred.
Eight years after its decision in Andrus, the Court confronted in
Irving a statute that prevented Native American owners of highly
fractionated interests in land from passing those fractional shares upon
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See supra note 17.
481 U.S. 704 (1987).
444 U.S. 51 (1979).
Id. at 55.
Id. at 65-68.
Id.at 65.
Id. at 66.

38.

Id.

39. Id. at 67. For a more detailed discussion of the prohibition cases upon which the Court
relied in Andrus, see infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
40. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 67- 68.
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their deaths. In the late nineteenth century, as part of a policy to force
Native Americans to "abandon their nomadic ways" and to speed their
assimilation, Congress enacted a series of statutes that allotted communal
reservation land to individual Native Americans." The United States held
allotted lands in trust so as to prevent the "improvident disposition" of
the land to white settlers.42 As original owners died, the allotments passed
by descent and devise to their heirs.43 Over time, the allotted parcels split
among an increasing number of descendents." In some cases, hundreds of
individuals owned one small parcel. 5 The cost of administering such
miniscule fractional shares often exceeded the income the property could
generate (or even the value of the fractional share itself).46
To resolve this growing problem, Congress enacted the Indian Land
Consolidation Act in 1983."7 Section 207 of that statute included an
"escheat" provision that prohibited the descent or devise of any interest
that represented less than two percent of the total tract in question.48
Although the owner of such fractional shares would enjoy income from
the property until death, upon her death the property would pass
automatically back to the tribe. 49 The statute allowed fractional owners to
transfer their shares (either by sale or gift) before death, but if they died
while holding such small shares of property, the shares would escheat to
the tribe."
Several Native Americans filed suit, alleging that the statute took
their property without compensation. Asserting the fundamental nature
of the right to pass on one's property through descent or devise, the
Court ruled in favor of the property owners.5" "In one form or another,"
the Court reasoned, "the right to pass on property-to one's family in
particular-has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since
feudal times."52 As a consequence, the Court concluded, the Takings
Clause prohibited Congress from abrogating that right without
compensating affected property-owners. 3

41.
42.

Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 706 (1987).
See id. at 707.

43. See id.
44.
45.
46.

See id.
See id. at 708, 713.
See id. at 713. The Court discussed one fractional share of land that was so small that it

generated only one cent of income for its owner every 177 years. Id. The entire tract was worth
only $8,000.00, but generated $17,560 in administrative costs each year. See id.
47. Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-459, Tit. II, 96 Stat. 2519 (1983).
48. Id. § 207, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (2004); see also Irving, 481 U.S. at 709.

49. See id.
50. See id. at 715.
51. Id. at 716.
52. Id.

53. See id. at 716-17
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It is difficult to square the Court's reasoning in Irving with the more
nuanced approach it took, and with the result it reached, in Andrus. In
Irving, the Court focused narrowly on the essential nature of the
abrogated property right, whereas in Andrus, it took a broader view,
emphasizing the nature of the rights that remained in the hands of the
owners of eagle parts. There can be little doubt, however, that the
interests left to the landowners in Irving were far more valuable, at least
in economic terms, than those remaining to the plaintiffs in Andrus. After
all, the owners in Irving were entitled to earn income from the property
until their death; they also retained the full right to sell, give away, or
trade their property, as long as they did so before they died. But even
adopting the Irving Court's narrow focus on the abrogated interest, it is
difficult to argue that the right to sell property lawfully in one's
possession is less deeply rooted in the "Anglo-American legal system"'
than the right to pass property upon death."
Indeed, the Court in Irving acknowledged the tension between its
decision and the reasoning in Andrus by citing Andrus as adverse
precedent, though it offered no basis on which to distinguish the case.56
Furthermore, Justice Scalia, in an opinion joined by two other justices
from the Irving majority, observed that "the balance between rights taken
and rights left untouched" in Irving was "indistinguishable" from that in
Andrus.57

Although unmentioned in any of the Irving opinions, one possible
distinction between the two cases is the type of property at issue. Irving
involved property in land, whereas Andrus, and several of the cases on
which it relied, involved personal property. The notion that the different
outcomes in Irving and Andrus reflected an unstated distinction between
personal property and land is reinforced by the observation that virtually
all of the successful takings claims in the Supreme Court over the past
two decades have been made by landowners.5" And the Court itself has
subsequently endorsed the idea that it found no taking in Andrus
precisely because that case involved the regulation of personal property
and not land. 9

54. Id. at 716.
55. See, e.g., Magoun v. Ill. Trust & Say. Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 288 (1898) (noting that the
"right to take property by devise or descent is a creature of the law, and not a natural right-a
privilege, and therefore the authority which confers it may impose conditions upon it").
56. See Irving, 481 U.S. at 717.
57. See id. at 719 (Scalia, J., concurring).
58. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
59. See Lucas. 505 U.S. at 1027-28.
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Lucas' Explicit DistinctionBetween PersonalPropertyand Land

The Court has traditionally evaluated regulatory takings claims
under a balancing test set forth in its opinion in Penn Central. In that
case, the Court analyzed the plaintiff's regulatory takings claim by
weighing three "essentially ad hoc" factors: (1) the diminution in value of
property attributable to the challenged regulation; (2) the extent to which
the regulation interfered with the owner's "investment-backed
expectations;" and (3) the character of the government action. 6
Between Penn Central and Lucas, the most significant departure
from this ad hoc approach came in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CA TV Corp.,61 a case in which a landlord alleged that a government
regulation requiring her to allow the local cable franchise to install
equipment on her property constituted a taking.62 There, the Court held
that regulations resulting in the permanent physical occupation of one's
property always constitute a taking.63 In Lucas, the Supreme Court
crafted another per se rule for regulatory takings, this time covering
situations when property is stripped of all economic value. More
importantly for the purposes of this Article, the Lucas Court for the first
time explicitly raised the notion of a categorical distinction between
personal property and land within regulatory takings law.
The facts of Lucas are well known. In the late 1970s, David Lucas, a
South Carolina developer, was involved in the development of the Isle of
Palms, "a barrier island situated eastward of the city of Charleston." 6 In
the mid-1980s, after Lucas and his partners had sold most of the other
property in the area "at rapidly escalating prices," 65 Lucas purchased two
lots in one of the Isle of Palms subdivisions for his own use.' Although
the land he had purchased was "notoriously unstable" and had even been
submerged for several years, 67 Lucas planned to build homes on each
lot.' In 1988, however, the South Carolina legislature enacted a statute
prohibiting construction beyond the line of beach erosion, an area that
included Lucas's land.69 As a result, Lucas was completely barred from
building habitable structures on his two lots.70

60. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).
61. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
62. 458 U.S. at 423-24.
63. Id. at 441.
64. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992).
65. See id. at 1038 & n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 1008.
67. See id. at 1038-39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
68. See id. at 1008.
69. See id.
70. See id.
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Lucas filed suit in South Carolina state court, arguing that the statute
took his land by completely extinguishing its economic value. In a finding
of fact that was almost certainly incorrect, 1 the trial court agreed that the
statute deprived Lucas of the entire value of his land.7" It concluded that,
as a result of that deprivation, the State had taken Lucas's property
without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 73 The South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding
that the statute was justified by the legislature's power to "prevent
serious public harm."74
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
South Carolina Supreme Court, announcing its new "per se" rule. The
Court held that when a landowner is deprived of all economically
beneficial use of a piece of land, that is, when a landowner's property has
been rendered "valueless," his property has been "taken" within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment and the landowner must be
compensated." The Court qualified its holding, however, by observing
that compensation would not be due when the regulation depriving the
owner of all value in his land does no more than "duplicate the result that
could have been achieved by the courts" under the state's common law of
nuisance.76
In his dissent, Justice Stevens pointed out several troubling
implications of the Court's new rule: "[u]nder the Court's opinion
today... , if a State should decide to prohibit the manufacture of
asbestos, cigarettes, or concealable firearms, for example, it must be
prepared to pay for the adverse economic consequences of its decision.""
Such regulations, Justice Stevens properly suggested, would likely
deprive manufacturers and merchants of all economically beneficial uses
in existing stocks of such materials, and in the equipment used to produce
them." Because such a prohibition would not merely duplicate results
71. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 350 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Surely, the land at
issue in Lucas retained some market value based on the contingency, which soon came to
fruition, that the development ban would be amended." (citation omitted)).
72. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009.
73. See id.
74. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 898 (1991).
75. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016. Although Justice Scalia often speaks in terms of a
regulation's deprivation of all "economically beneficial use" of property, see id. at 1027, as
opposed to a deprivation of "value," it appears that he viewed the two concepts (total
deprivation of economic value and total deprivation of economic uses) as amounting to the same
thing. See, e.g., id. at 1020 (grounding the application of the per se rule on the trial court's finding
that Lucas's property had been rendered "valueless"); see also Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330.
76. See id. at 1029. Other commentators have thoroughly exposed the enormous
ambiguities introduced by this exception into the Lucas Court's seemingly crystalline analysis.
See supranote 12.
77. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. As a general matter, however, mere prohibition of the sale of a category of personal
property will not destroy the property's economic value because thd product can usually be
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that could be achieved through the common law of nuisance, the Lucas
Court's per se rule would require compensation for government
regulation where, but for Lucas, almost no one would have thought it to
be required.
Perhaps in response to Justice Stevens's parade of horribles, all of
which involved items of personal property, the Court indicated that it
intended its per se rule to apply only to property in land. Throughout his
opinion, Justice Scalia studiously avoided generic references to regulation
of "property," and instead repeatedly and narrowly referred to "land-use
regulations" that deprive a "land owner" of all economically beneficial
uses of "land." 79 Lest the significance of his careful word-choice be lost on
moved to a jurisdiction where its sale is permitted. But the value of such property will be
destroyed, at least as to merchants and manufacturers, when the prohibition on its sale is
conjoined with restrictions on its transportation or export outside of the regulated jurisdiction, as
occurred both with alcohol during prohibition, see U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII; Everard's
Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 556-58 (1924) (prohibition on the sale and transportation of
alcohol deprived manufacturers and vendors of alcoholic beverages of all economic value in
their production facilities and stock on hand), and with eagle feathers in Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51, 53 n.1 (1979) ("Migratory birds, their parts, nests, or eggs, lawfully acquired prior to the
effective date of Federal protection under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. . . may be possessed
or transported without a Federal permit, but may not be imported, exported, purchased, sold,
bartered, or offered for purchase, sale, trade, or barter." (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 21.2(a) (1978)).
Additionally, the owner of personal property designed specifically for use in a particular industry
can be deprived of its economic value when onerous regulations are imposed on that industry.
For example, many west coast fishermen have suffered enormous declines in the values of their
fishing boats as a result of government-imposed restrictions on fishing activities. Given the
limited utility of these boats for anything other than fishing, and the prohibitive expense of, or
legal restrictions on, moving them to more profitable fishing grounds, see Am. Pelagic Fishing
Co. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 36, 44 (2001) (discussing the legal restrictions on moving a
fishing vessel into foreign waters), the boats have become virtually impossible to sell. The
consequences for individual fishermen have been personally devastating. See William Booth,
West Coast Fishermen Sense End of the Line, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2002, at A3; American Pelagic
Fishing Co., 49 Fed. C1. at 50 (noting that, once the plaintiff lost his fishing license, the value of
his boat was virtually eliminated).
79. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 ("The second situation in which we have found categorical
treatment appropriate is where regulation denies all economically and beneficial or productive
use of land." (emphasis added)); id. at 1016 ("As we have said on numerous occasions, the Fifth
Amendment is violated when land-use regulation 'does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land."') (emphasis added); id. at 1017
("Perhaps... total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the
equivalent of a physical appropriation." (emphasis added)); id. ("Surely, at least, in the
extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is
permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the legislature is simply
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life.") (emphasis added); id. at 1018 ("[T]he
functional basis for permitting the government ... to affect property values without
compensation... does not apply to the relatively rare situation where the government has
deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial uses.") (emphasis added); id. ("regulations
that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or productive options for its use...
carry with them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public
service") (emphasis added); id. at 1019 ("We think, in short, that there are good reasons for our
frequently expressed belief that when the owner of real property has been called upon to
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good ... he has suffered a
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the reader, however, Justice Scalia spelled out in express terms the nature
and basis of the Court's distinction between land and other forms of
property:
And in the case of personal property, by reason of the State's
traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings, [an
owner] ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might
even render his property economically worthless (at least if the
property's only economically productive use is sale or manufacture
for sale). See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1979) (prohibition
on sale of eagle feathers). In the case of land, however, we think the
notion pressed by the [South Carolina Coastal] Council that title is
somehow held subject to the 'implied limitation' that the State may
subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent
with the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has
become part of our constitutional culture.'
In other words, because of (1) their expectation that they will be
subjected to greater regulation and (2) the historically favored status of
land, owners of personal property are entitled to less regulatory takings
protection than are owners of land. Consequently, they cannot take
advantage of the Court's per se Lucas rule.'
In addition to blunting the force of Justice Stevens's hypotheticals,
the Court's careful distinction between land and personal property
allowed it to assert the consistency of the rule it was announcing in Lucas
with a line of cases that, though largely undiscussed in Justice Scalia's
opinion, loomed ominously in the background. Those cases rejected out

taking.") (emphasis added); id. at 1027 ("Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that
deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the
logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use
interests were not part of his title to begin with." (emphasis added)); id. at 1029 ("We believe
similar treatment must be accorded. .. regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use
of land.") (emphasis added); id at 1030 ("When... a regulation that declares 'off-limits' all
economically productive or beneficial uses of land goes beyond what the relevant background
principles would dictate, compensation must be paid to sustain it.") (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 1027-28.
81. The recent apparent narrowing of the Lucas rule in Tahoe Sierra does little to diminish
the significance of Lucas's treatment of personal property. Tahoe Sierra clarifies that the
diminution in value suffered by a property-owner must be permanent in order to constitute a per
se taking and seems to substantially narrow the number of instances in which Lucas takings of
land might occur. But the case does very little to diminish the number of Lucas takings of
personal property that would arise, were such claims permitted, because most such claims would
involve permanent deprivations of value. See, e.g., supra note 78 (discussing scenarios in which
owners of personal property might suffer a total deprivation of value). Thus, even if Lucas is
virtually a dead-letter with respect to regulations affecting land, it would still be a potent toot for
limiting the state's power to regulate if its distinction between land and other forms of property
were disregarded, as has occurred in some lower courts. See infra Part I.C. Because the Court's
favoritism towards land extends beyond the scope of the Lucas rule to the entire area of
regulatory takings (as opposed to direct takings and their functional equivalents), see supra note
20, it is important to explore the cogency of that favoritism as a normative matter.
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of hand takings claims brought by the owners of personal property that
had been stripped of all economic value.
The earliest of these cases arose during the prohibition era, when
plaintiffs brought takings claims alleging that various federal laws
deprived them of property in stocks of alcohol on hand at the time the
laws were enacted. In Ruppert v. Caffey82 and Everard's Breweries v.
Day, 3 the Court rejected such claims, even though the challenged laws

surely deprived the dealers of all economically beneficial uses of their
alcohol.' In Everard's Breweries, for example, the Court noted that the
plaintiff could do nothing with the large stock of alcohol in his possession
except "dispose [of it], after de-alcoholization, at a heavy loss.""8 The
Court nonetheless found no "appropriation of private property, but
merely a lessening of value due to a permissible restriction imposed upon
its use." 86
Many years later, citing Caffey and Everard'sBreweries, the Court in

Andrus rejected the claims of the dealers in Native American artifacts.
Although the Court suggested that the plaintiffs retained some
economically beneficial uses of their property (for example, the Court
somewhat implausibly suggested that they could display their artifacts for
a charge), 7 it is clear that the Andrus plaintiffs' property declined in
value at least as much as Lucas's. Indeed, the entire purpose of the
regulations at issue in Andrus was to destroy the economic value of eagle
parts in order to eliminate any financial incentive for poachers to kill
eagles.' The Lucas Court's categorical distinction between personal

82. 251 U.S. 264 (1920).
83. 265 U.S. 545 (1924).
84. The Court's rejection of the plaintiff's takings claim did not rely on any argument that
the Eighteenth Amendment had implicitly amended the Fifth Amendment to allow such
deprivations in the case of alcohol. See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 67 n.23.
85. See Everard's Breweries,265 U.S. at 556.
86. Caffey, 251 U.S. at 303; see Everard's Breweries, 265 U.S. at 563. Everard's Breweries
presented a particular problem for the Lucas majority, since it was decided after the Court's
decision in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the case identified by the Lucas
majority as the principal authority for the regulatory takings doctrine. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1014 ("Prior to Justice Holmes's exposition in [Mahon]... it was generally thought that the
Takings Clause reached only a 'direct appropriation' of property"). Indeed, the Court's decision
in Everard's Breweries was joined by Justice Holmes, Mahon's author. The outcome of these
cases cannot be cleanly explained as falling within the Lucas Court's "nuisance" exception.
Courts reached widely varying conclusions about the status of alcohol under nuisance law. See
Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1549,
1582-83 (2003). Indeed, the confusion surrounding the status of alcohol under nuisance law hints
at the deep uncertainties hidden within the Lucas nuisance exception.
87. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
88. See supranotes 36-40 and accompanying text.
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property and land allowed it to sweep this troublesome set of cases to the
side. 9
In addition to helping it to distinguish the prohibition cases, the
Court's narrow focus on land in Lucas helped it to reconcile its decision
with another inconvenient line of cases, in which the Court had
repeatedly denied claims by business owners who suffered ruinous
financial losses as a result of regulations prohibiting the operation of their
existing enterprises. In Mugler v. Kansas, for example, the plaintiff was
forced to shut down his brewery because of a Kansas prohibition on the
production of alcohol.' In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, the owner of a brick
factory had to close his business after it became subject to a Los Angeles
prohibition on the manufacture of bricks within city limits.91 Finally, in
Reinman v. Little Rock, the plaintiffs had to close the livery stable
business they had conducted "for many years" after a newly-enacted city
ordinance prohibited such businesses within a specified geographic area.'
The Lucas Court distinguished these cases by focusing on the fact that,
even if the regulations rendered the plaintiffs' businesses valueless, the
plaintiffs were free to put their land to other, economically beneficial,
uses. As a result, the Court reasoned, they were not wholly deprived of
the value of their land.93 By focusing narrowly on the remaining
economically beneficial uses of the land on which the Mugler, Hadacheck,
and Reinman plaintiffs' businesses were located, the Lucas Court could
distinguish those cases in which the Court had looked with indifference
on situations in which regulations had eliminated the value of other types
of property (the brewery, the brick factory, the livery stable, and the
specialized equipment contained within those structures).94 In short, the
Court's distinction in Lucas between land and other forms of property
allowed it to claim consistency with the letter (if not the spirit) of earlier
cases, while avoiding the most troubling implications of its newly created
rule for general economic regulation.

89. See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992) (citing Andrus, 444 U.S. 51). Although the Court
did not cite the prohibition era cases directly, its citation of Andrus, which discussed them at
some length suggests that it was aware of them.
90. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
91. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
92. 237 U.S. 171, 173 (1915).
93. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026 & n.13 (distinguishing Mugler, Hadacheck, and Reinman by
focusing on the remaining permitted uses of the underlying land, but ignoring the effects of the
regulations at issue in the cases on plaintiff's non-land property).
94. See Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 405 (noting plaintiff's allegation that his property had been
specially adapted for use as a brickyard); Reinman, 237 U.S. at 623 (noting plaintiff's observation
that its livery buildings were "useful for no other purpose"); Mugler, 123 U.S. at 274 (noting that
plaintiff's building had been "specially constructed and adapted for the manufacture of... malt
liquor").
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C. Application of the Lucas Distinctionin the Lower Courts

The response in the lower courts to the Lucas distinction between
personal property and land has been mixed. Some have treated the
Court's distinction as an affirmation of a general preference for
landownership in regulatory takings law.9' Other courts have applied the
distinction literally, holding simply that personal property is not covered
by the Lucas diminution-of-value rule and that a regulatory taking of
such property must be established, if at all, under Penn Central's ad hoc
balancing approach. Finally, at least one court of appeals has rejected the
distinction altogether.
The First Circuit appears to have followed the Lucas majority in
distinguishing land from other forms of property. In Philip Morris, Inc. v.
Reilly, the First Circuit, sitting en banc, held unconstitutional a
Massachusetts statute requiring tobacco companies to disclose ingredient
lists to the state, which could then publish the lists under certain
circumstances.96 The tobacco companies challenged the statute, arguing
that it took their property, in the form of trade secrets, in violation of the
Takings Clause. Reversing the three-judge panel, the en banc court
agreed.97 Although the en banc panel was unable to produce a single
opinion for the court, a majority of the en banc judges agreed that the
Supreme Court's per se Lucas rule applied only to land and that the
proper framework for assessing regulatory takings with respect to other
forms of property was the Supreme Court's ad hoc approach in Penn
Central, even when the regulation at issue completely eliminated the
value of the property.98
Other courts of appeals have similarly relied upon the Supreme
Court's Lucas distinction. In Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson,99 the Third
Circuit rejected a claim by a coal company that it had suffered a
categorical taking when the government retroactively imposed liability

95. See, e.g., Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Because of 'the
State's traditionally high degree of control of commercial dealings,' the principles of takings law
that apply to real property do not apply in the same manner to statutes imposing monetary
liability." (citation omitted) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28)).
96. See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 28-29 (Ist Cir. 2002) (Torruella, J.).
97. See id. at 29-30, 46.
98. See id. at 35, 41 (applying the Penn Central balancing test even though the plaintiff's
trade secrets would "lose all value" under the statute); see id. at 52-53 (Lipez, J., dissenting)
(agreeing with Judge Torruella's analysis but disagreeing with the outcome of his application of
the Penn Central test); see also Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, Nos. 00-2425, 00-2449, 2001 WL
1215365, at *7 (1st Cir. Oct. 16, 2001) ("While a complete seizure of personal property may
amount to a categorical taking, we cannot conclude, under the reasoning of Lucas, that the
regulation of personal property which may be destructive of the value of trade secret
information can be regarded as such a [per se] taking.") (opinion withdrawn for rehearing en
banc).
99. See Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649 (3d Cir. 1999).
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for miners' benefits. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied in part on
the Supreme Court's distinction between personal property and land."
"[T]he 'total destruction' language of cases concerning real property," it
said, should not be "mechanically applied" to cases concerning other
types of property. 1 ' The Ninth Circuit likewise relied on the Lucas
distinction between land and personal property in declining to apply a per
se takings analysis to a challenge to Washington State's Interest On
Lawyers' Trust Accounts (IOLTA) program." 2 The court observed
repeatedly that "[s]uch an analysis has almost exclusively been employed
1 3
Applying instead the Penn
in situations involving real property.""
Central balancing test, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' takings
claim."

Finally, in line with Lucas, the Court of Claims applied the Supreme
Court's Penn Central test to a case involving personal property stripped
of all value. In American Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States,"'5 the

plaintiff alleged that his highly specialized fishing boat had been rendered
valueless when competing fishermen, who feared the impact of the
plaintiff's larger boat on their profitability, used their influence in
Congress to have the plaintiff's fishing licenses revoked." 6 The Court of
Claims, which ultimately found that a taking had occurred, reasoned that,
in the context of takings claims involving "both tangible and intangible
personalty, ... [t]he relevant test for a regulatory taking... is the nowtraditional Penn Centralthree part analysis."'0"

Other courts, however, have rejected the Lucas distinction between
personal property and property in land. In Maritrans Inc. v. United
100. See id. at 674-75.
101. Id.
102. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (en
banc).
103. See id. at 854-57. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Washington Legal Foundationdid not
implicate the precise distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in Lucas because the taking
alleged by the plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit involved a direct confiscation, or physical taking, of
property rather than a mere reduction in value. Accordingly, the per se rule that would have
applied was not the Lucas diminution-in-value test but rather the physical occupation test
discussed by the Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427
(1982). See also supra note 9; Washington Legal Foundation, 271 F.3d at 854; Brown v. Legal
Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003) (stating in dicta that a per se approach under Loretto
seemed consistent with the Court's prior analysis of IOLTA programs).
104. See Washington Legal Foundation,271 F.3d at 856-62.
105. 49 Fed. Cl. 36 (2001).
106. Id. at 38-44.
107. Id. at 46. See also Wilson v. City of Louisville, 957 F. Supp. 948, 955 (W.D. Ky. 1997)
(noting the Lucas Court's distinction between land and personal property and stating that "even
if the Ordinance rendered all of [plaintiff's] signs worthless, it is questionable whether it would
constitute a taking."); Raynor v. Md. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, 110 Md. App. 165, 189
(1996) ("[In Lucas, t]he Supreme Court, therefore, recognized that, unlike its dealings with real
property, government may deprive an owner of personal property of all of that property's
economic value through regulation without owing compensation.").
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States,"° the Federal Circuit considered a takings claim brought on behalf
of Maritrans Inc., the owner of a fleet of tank barges used to transport oil.
Maritrans challenged the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which required,
among other things, that vessels used to transport oil in U.S. territorial
waters have double hulls.1" The statute further required owners of singlehulled vessels to retrofit them with a second hull in order to continue
operating in U.S. territorial waters after January 1, 1995.110 As a

consequence of the statute, Maritrans was forced to retrofit, scrap, or sell
several single-hulled vessels.' Maritrans filed suit against the United
States, arguing that the statute constituted, per se, a taking of its property
under Lucas.

The government argued that "the concept of a categorical taking
cannot be extended to regulations that restrict the use of personal
property."" 2 The Federal Circuit rejected the government's argument
and applied the Lucas diminution-in-value test to the plaintiff's claim. 3
Although it ultimately found no categorical taking to have occurred, the
Federal Circuit made clear its belief that a categorical taking of personal
property occurs whenever a government regulation deprives an owner of
"all economically viable use, i.e., all economic value has been taken by
the regulatory imposition," whether the affected property is land or
chattels. " 4

Like the Federal Circuit, other courts have declined to apply a
blanket rule in favor of landownership. The South Carolina Supreme
Court has stated without elaboration that the Lucas per se rule applies
with full force to personal property. " ' And the Colorado Supreme Court
has taken Justice Scalia's language in the opposite direction concluding
that, in the context of a heavily regulated industry, land (like personal
property) is not subject to Lucas's per se takings analysis." 6 Thus, despite
108. 342 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
109. See 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) (2004).
110. See id.
111. See Maritrans, 342 F.3d at 1350.
112. Id. at 1352.
113. See id. at 1352-55.
114. See id. at 1353.
115. See Long Cove Club Assocs. v. Hilton Head Island, 319 S.C. 30, 32 (1995) ("Long Cove
does not cite, nor has our research uncovered, any authority for the proposition that the Lucas
analysis does not apply to an alleged regulatory taking of personal, as opposed to real,
property."). Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in Philip Morris, Judge Selya strongly rejected
the First Circuit's refusal to apply the Lucas per se analysis to property other than land, accusing
the majority of "adopt[ing] an overly literal view." See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, Nos. 00-2425,
00-2449, 2001 WL 1215365, at *22-23 (1st Cir. Oct. 16, 2001) (Selya, J., dissenting) ("I believe
that in limiting Lucas and its progeny to land use cases, the majority has adopted an overly
literal view.").
116. See State v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1000 n.4 (Colo. 1995) (finding the distinction
between personal property and land inappropriate in the context of land that was traditionally
subject to heavy regulation); see also id. at 1011 (Scott, J., dissenting) (noting that the trial court
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the Supreme Court's clear intention in Lucas to apply a lower regulatory
takings standard to personal property, the status of such property within
regulatory takings law remains a source of some confusion.
II.

EVALUATING THE SUPREME COURT'S EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN PERSONAL PROPERTY AND LAND IN THE REGULATORY TAKINGS
CONTEXT

In light of the potentially significant consequences of the Court's
favoritism toward land in the regulatory takings context, it is worth
asking whether there is some principled basis for such disparate
treatment of property owners. This question is particularly salient
because the Court's distinction between land and personal property is so
puzzling. To begin with, the distinction finds no support in the plain text
of the Constitution. The Fifth Amendment protects "private property,"
but does not distinguish between personal property and land." 7 And in
property, the Court has
cases involving direct government seizures of
8
same.1
the
property
real
and
treated personal
One obvious starting point in attempting to explain the Court's
distinction is to consider the two justifications offered by the Court in
Lucas itself: the historical treatment of land in our legal tradition and the
expectations of property-owners. As it turns out, neither of these two
explanations justifies the Court's categorical favoritism towards
landownership.
A.

The Inadequacy of the Court's HistoricalExplanationfor the
Distinction between PersonalPropertyand Land

In Lucas, the Court suggested that a preference within regulatory
takings law for property in land was required by an "historical compact"
with landowners that "has become part of our constitutional culture."' 19
The Court did not elaborate on the nature of this compact. This section
considers four possible historical arguments to support the Court's
distinction: first, the history of the distinction between personal property
and land; second, the early practices of English eminent domain law;
third, the apparent motives of the framers in adding the Takings Clause
to the Bill of Rights; and, fourth, the connection between landownership
and political participation in the early republic. As I will demonstrate,
had determined that the plaintiff had been "deprived of its entire economic interest in the
property" at issue and complaining that the majority "impermissibly blurs the distinction
between takings of real and personal property").
117. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Lazarus, supra note 12, at 1423; THOMPSON ON REAL

PROPERTY' §14.b3, at 184 (David A. Thomas ed., Supp. 1999) ("The teTm 'property,' WheM used
in its most comprehensive sense, will include both real and personal property, unless restricted in
its meaning by the context.").
118. See EAGLE, supra note 22, at 88.
119. See Lucas, 505 US. at 1028.
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none of these considerations supports the Court's position that land is
more entitled to regulatory takings protection than other forms of
property.
1.

History of the Distinction Between PersonalPropertyand Land

The practice of categorizing property as either personal or real has
deep roots within the common law tradition.12 ° The most widely accepted
explanation for the distinction traces its origins to the rise of the feudal
system in England."' After the Norman Conquest, land became subject
to the law of feudal tenure, which did not apply to movable things, known
as "chattels" or "goods.' 122 Under the system of feudal tenure, all land
belonged ultimately to the Crown and thus, no subject could be the
absolute owner of land. Consequently, all land was held "of the king or
some mesne lord" and was subject to pervasive restrictions on
alienation. 123 Moreover, under feudal principles, land could not
automatically pass to one's heirs, but reverted to the crown upon the
death of a vassal.' 24 In contrast, chattels remained the objects of direct
and absolute ownership, particular to an owner, "of which he could
dispose at will." 2 '
If anything, because land was traditionally subject to greater state
restriction on individual ownership rights, feudal history suggests that
personal property rights are more absolute and therefore justify greater
expectations on the part of the owner. In any event, the distinction, which
is rooted in circumstances that never existed in the United States, has not
resonated as strongly in American property law.'26

120. See Carol Rose, "Takings" and the Practicesof Property: Property as Wealth, Property
as "Propriety," in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 49,58-60 (1994); E.P. Krauss, On the Distinction
Between Real and PersonalProperty, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 485, 492 (1984).
121. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 117, § 14.03, at 181-82 (Supp. 1999) ; JOSHUA
WILLIAMS, PRINCIPLES ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 1, 6-8 (18th ed. 1926).
122. WILLIAMS, supra note 121, at 8-10.
123. See id. at 7 & n.(p).
124. See Daniel W. Bromley, Rousseau's Revenge: The Demise of the Freehold Estate, in
WHO OWNS AMERICA? SOCIAL CONFLICT OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS 19, 21-23 (Harvey M.
Jacobs ed. 1998).
125. WILLIAMS, supranote 121, at 13-14. Similarly, Blackstone viewed personal property as,
in some sense, the more natural subject of ownership than property in land. See 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2-*11 (1766) ("And there can be no doubt, but that movables
of every kind became sooner appropriated than the permanent substantial soil:.., because few
of them could be fit for use, till improved and ameliorated by the bodily labor of the occupant,
which bodily labor, bestowed upon any subject which before lay in common to all men, is
universally allowed to give the fairest and most reasonable title to an exclusive property
therein.").
126. THOMPSON, supra note 117, § 14.03, at 182 (Supp. 1999) ("It is important... to keep in
mind that [the distinction between land and personal property is] traceable to conditions no
longer existing in England, and which never had any existence in this country.").
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The argument might be made that landownership conferred special
status in feudal society, a status that accompanies landownership to this
day, and that deprivation of property in land consequently works a
special kind of harm. But such considerations would only justify a
differential rule in the context of direct confiscation. The statusconferring power of property is unaffected by the mere regulation of
land, no matter how intrusive, because regulation, by definition, does not
affect title ownership of the regulated property. Thus, the special status
associated with landownership, can not justify heightened protection
against regulatory takings.
Moreover, whatever special significance landownership once had in
feudal societies, increasing commodification of land has steadily eroded
that significance.' 27 In the modern economy, land is just another form of
property. As Charles Geisler has observed: "[a]s service-sector
employment grows at the expense of manufacturing and more basic
extractive livelihoods, the domestic importance of land-based
occupations fades along with the declining significance of land as a factor
of production, social status, and basis of wealth." 2 ' Thus, the history of
the distinction between personal property and land fails adequately to
explain the Lucas distinction.
2.

Early Practices of Eminent Domain Law

Likewise, the early English history of eminent domain law offers no
support for the Court's distinction, and arguably even cuts the other way.
The first references in English law to the requirement that the sovereign
compensate his subjects for confiscated property dealt with personal
property requisitioned by the king for use by the royal household. 29
While the king sometimes had the right to make use of private land
without compensation, he could never take a subject's personal property
without paying for it. 3 The Magna Charta specified that the king could
take corn and other provisions from his subjects against their will, but he

127.
128.

See Bosselman, supra note 24.
Charles Geisler, Ownership: An Overview, 58 RURAL Soc. 532, 542 (1993); see also

WILLIAM B. SCoTr, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY FROM
THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 201-02 (1977) (noting that, as American

society shifted from an agrarian to an industrial society over the course of the nineteenth
century, the social and political importance of landownership declined).
129. See William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV.
553,562-63 (1972).
130. See id. While the king could use a subject's land for the purposes of national defense
(for example, to build fortifications or to extract the raw materials for gunpowder) without
compensation, he could not take possessory interest in land. See id. Only Parliament could do so;
and, whenever Parliament did, it paid compensation. See id.
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had to make immediate cash payment.'

The Magna Charta was silent,

however, on the subject of compensation for takings of land." 2
3.

Original Understandingof the Takings Clause

Nor can the Court find support for its position in the original
understanding of the Takings Clause. Although the history of the Takings
Clause itself provides little evidence of its original meaning and
purpose,'33 scholars have suggested that it was intended to combat
uncompensated takings of both land and personal property."-4 Based on
his review of the limited contemporary commentary, Rubenfeld cites "the
appropriation of private [presumably personal] property to supply the
army during the Revolutionary War" as among the "paradigm case[s]" of
government behavior that the Takings Clause was intended to remedy."'
In light of such a motive, it seems unlikely that the uncompensated taking
of personal property was somehow less offensive to the Framers than the
uncompensated taking of land." 6
William Treanor's analysis buttresses the notion that the original
understanding of the Takings Clause deemed it to apply equally to both
land and personal property. Citing James Madison's personal
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understandingof the Takings Clause and
the PoliticalProcess, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 791-92 (1995).
134. See, e.g., JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 150-51 (1990)

(observing that the Framers' conception of property included both land and personal property).
135. See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1122-23 ("'[The Takings Clause] was probably
intended to restrain the arbitrary and oppressive mode of obtaining supplies for the army, and
other public uses, by impressments, as was too frequently practiced during the revolutionary
war, without any compensation whatever."' (quoting 1 HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER,
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES at 305-06 (Philadelphia Birch & Small 1803)).
136. See NEDELSKY,supra note 134, at 150-51. Carol Rose has noted that Thomas Jefferson
favored agricultural property over other forms of property as a guarantor of republican virtue.
See ROSE, supra note 120, at 61-62. But Jefferson's distinction is as much a distinction among
types of land as it is a distinction between land and personal property as such. That is, Jefferson
favored agricultural over urban industrial property. See id. Compare Stanley N. Katz, Thomas
Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 466 J.L. & ECON. 467, 473-74
(1976) ("Cultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens. They are the most vigorous, the
most independent, the most virtuous, and they are tied to their country and wedded to its liberty
and interests by the most lasting bands." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, Aug. 23, 1785, in 8 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
426-28 (Julian P. Boyd ed. 1953)), with Katz, supra, at 474 ("The mobs of great cities add just so
much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the human body."
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF

VIRGINIA 165 (William Peden ed. 1955)). Both of Jefferson's categories, however, included land.
Moreover, as discussed below, the category of agricultural property necessarily includes at least
some personal property. See infra Part III.A. Furthermore, that category of property has steadily
diminished in importance as fewer and fewer Americans make a living from agriculture. See
infra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
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correspondence, Treanor argues that Madison, the likely author of the
Takings Clause, assumed that it required compensation for slaves, who
were considered personal property. 37 In an 1819 letter to Robert Evans,
Madison said that "[the non-slave owning part of the nation] are too just
to wish that a partial sacrifice should be made for the general good; and
too well aware that whatever may be the intrinsic character of that
description of property [i.e., slaves], it is one known to the constitution,
and, as such could not be constitutionally taken away without just
compensation."' 3 8 Thus, the original understanding of the Takings Clause
offers no support for a distinction between personal property and land in
takings law.
4.

Landownership and Voting Rights

Finally, it might be argued that, notwithstanding this likely original
understanding of the scope of the Takings Clause, the relationship
between landownership and voting rights in the early republic made
uncompensated takings of land particularly troubling. Unlike takings of
personal property, takings of land could deprive landowners of
substantial political rights.'39 Whatever the merits of such an argument in
the context of a political system that employs landownership as a
condition for full political participation, the argument loses its force once
such conditions have been dropped, as they were in the United States by
the mid-nineteenth century.140 Moreover, as already discussed in relation
to the importance of property within feudal society, such status-based
explanations have no force in the particular context of regulatory takings
(as opposed to direct confiscations) because regulatory takings do not
affect title ownership. 4 ' Thus, none of these potential historical
explanations supports the Court's distinction between land and personal
property in regulatory takings.
B.

The Failureof the Court's "Reasonable Expectations" Justification

Besides referring to a vague "historical compact," the Court in Lucas
attempted to ground its distinction between personal property and land
in the expectations of property owners, suggesting that "in the case of
137.
138.

See Treanor,supra note 133, at 839.
See id. (quoting Letter from James Madison to Robert Evans (June 15, 1819), reprinted

in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON
315 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1981)).
139. See Sean Wilentz, Propertyand Power.-Suffrage Reform in the United States, 1787-1860.
in VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 31, 32-39 (Donald W. Rogers ed.
1992): see also SCOTT, supra note 128, at 201-02.
140. See Wilentz, supra note 139, at 32-39.
141. See id. at 32 (noting that most property qualifications in the early republic were based
on ownership of "title" in land).
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personal property, [an owner] ought to be aware of the possibility that
new regulation might even render his property economically worthless (at
least if the. property's only economically productive use is sale or
manufacture).' ' 2 This attempt to ground the distinction on owners'
differing reasonable expectations, however, fails to withstand close
scrutiny.
There are two ways to read the Lucas Court's statement. First, one
could understand it to mean that, because of the Court's own favoritism
toward land in its recent takings jurisprudence, a reasonable owner of
personal property, unlike a landowner, does not expect to receive
compensation when regulation reduces the value of that property to zero.
On this reading, however, the Court's explanation is somewhat circular
because it would justify the Court's decision not to compensate on the
basis of expectations generated in large part by the Court's own decisions
not to compensate. 143 Grounding entitlement to compensation in
expectations formed in large part by the Court's recent favoritism
towards land provides only weak support for the Court's distinction.
Alternatively, the Court could be understood as asserting that
owners of personal property, particularly property for "sale or
manufacture," have a greater expectation that the government will
heavily regulate their personal property, even to the point where the
property could lose all value. Such a reading eliminates (or at least
widens) the circle by grounding the property owners' expectations not in
the Court's favoritism toward land, but instead in differences in owners'
general expectations about the traditional pervasiveness of state
regulation of personal property." Although this alternative reading of
the Court's explanation ameliorates the logical problem inherent in
basing the distinction between personal property and land directly on
expectations created by the modern Court's own favoritism toward land,
it does so at the expense of factual accuracy.
As a descriptive matter, the Court's claim that the regulation of land
145
is less pervasive than regulation of personal property is unpersuasive.
Richard Lazarus has observed that, "[a]lthough there was a time when

142.

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992).

143. As Rubenfeld has observed, "a judicial holding that rescission of a particular right is
uncompensable would supply conclusive authority in any future case that an owner of that
particular right had no legitimate expectation that the right existed at anything other than the
state's sufferance." Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1110.

144. This alternative reading does not completely eliminate the circularity in basing
compensation decisions on owners' expectations because such expectations will always be
shaped to a certain extent by the Court's own compensation decisions. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1034-35 (Kennedy, J., concurring). But it has the virtue of expanding the circularity beyond the

confines of the Court's recent, land-based expansion of regulatory takings doctrine.
145. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324
(2002) ("Land-use regulations are ubiquitous .... "); Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1152.
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such a distinction could have validly been made, for the past twenty-five
years (long before most current property owners received their titles),
regulation of state and local land use has rivaled that of personal
property. '14 6 Can the Court really believe, in this post-Euclid147 world of
pervasive zoning and environmental land-use regulation, that land is any
less regulated than other items in commerce?
Indeed, in limiting his observation to the past twenty-five years,
Lazarus is too generous. As John Hart has demonstrated, pervasive landuse regulation is not (as is often assumed) a recent phenomenon. 48
Instead, it stretches back to colonial times. 49 "Contrary to the
conventional image of minimal land use regulation," Hart argues,
"government in the colonial period often exerted extensive authority
over private land for purposes unrelated to avoiding nuisance.""15
Historian William Cronon's observations about colonial land-use
regulation in New England reinforce Hart's assertions:
[Property rights in colonial New England] were never absolute, since
both town and colony retained sovereignty and could impose a variety
of restrictions on how land could be used. Burning might be
prohibited during certain seasons of the year. A grant might be
contingent on the land being used for a specific purpose-such as the
building of a mill-and there was initially a requirement in
Massachusetts that all land be improved within three years or its
Regulations might forbid land from
owner would forfeit rights to it.
51
the
town's
permission.'
sold
without
being
It might be argued that the Court's position in Lucas is not based
upon a factual assertion that the regulation of personal property is
actually more pervasive than the regulation of land. Instead, the
argument might go, the Court's statement about property-owners'
expectations rests on the belief that, as a conceptual matter, it is
intrinsically easy for regulations to deprive the owner of personal
property (particularly personal property for manufacture or sale) of all
economic value whereas it takes a particularly onerous sort of regulation
to deprive a landowner of all economically beneficial use of his land.
Because, to the manufacturer or merchant, personal property has but one

146. Lazarus, supra note 12, at 1424.
147. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding a zoning
ordinance over a landowner's claim that the regulation worked a 75% reduction in the value of
his property).
148. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1259-1281 (1996).
149. See id.; see also WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS,
AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND 73-74 (1983) (discussing the origins of early colonial
land-use restrictions in English property law).
150. See Hart, supra note 148, at 1257.
151. CRONON,supra note 149, at 73.
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use (sale), to deprive that owner of all value, the regulation need only
prohibit its sale. In contrast, because land has a greater diversity of
possible uses, it takes a more intrusive sort of regulation to squeeze all
the economic value out of it. The argument would conclude that it is
precisely such exceptionally onerous regulations that the regulatory
takings doctrine is intended to weed out.
The Court's own rulings, however, cast doubt on the notion that
even regulations eliminating the economic value of land are exceptionally
difficult to produce. After all, the only use prohibited in Lucas was the
"construction of occupiable improvements.""15 It seems difficult to argue
that restricting residential construction on land is intrinsically more
onerous than prohibiting a category of personal property from being sold
or transported to a locale where its sale is permitted.t5 3
In short, the text and history of the Takings Clause provide no
immediate support for the Court's categorical distinction between
personal property and land. Nor can owners' reasonable expectations,
however conceived, bear the weight the Court would place upon them.
The next step, then, is to evaluate whether the distinction holds up under
any of the various normative theories proposed by takings scholars.
II1.

CAN NORMATIVE THEORIES OF PROPERTY LAW SUPPORT THE LUCAS
DISTINCTION?

My discussion of the implications of various normative theories of
property for the distinction between personal property and land includes
a broad cross-section of property theories: (1) the idea that private
property must be protected from government intrusion because private
ownership is essential to liberty, a view that has deep roots in American
property thinking; (2) Radin's position, based upon her Hegelian theory
of property for personhood, that nonfungible property should be subject
to heightened takings protection; (3) the belief that government
152. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1008-09 & n.2 (1992) ("The Act did allow
the construction of certain nonhabitable improvements").
153. It might be argued (though the Court did not say this in Lucas) that favoring real over
personal property is consistent with the Court's traditional concern within regulatory takings law
to "protect[] individual property owners from bearing public burdens." See Tahoe-Sierra, 535
U.S. at 332 (describing one of the principal goals of the regulatory takings doctrine as
"protecting individual property owners from bearing public burdens, which in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Taking and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1989) (discussing the equal treatment theory of takings). This "equal
protection" component of takings law could be understood to refer to situations in which a
property owner is literally singled out for differential treatment. On such an understanding, it
might make sense to treat land and personal property differently, because every parcel of land is
in some sense unique. One could argue that it is more likely that a regulated landowner has been
intentionally singled out. Such an argument would more properly be employed to support a rule
that all nonfungible property (and not just land) should be entitled to heightened takings
protection.
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interference with property holdings will generate disutility, a notion at
the heart of the theory of takings set forth in Michelman's classic 1967
article; (4) the view, based upon the insights of public choice theory, that
takings scrutiny should be at its highest under circumstances in which the
political process is likely to break down; and, (5) the social theory of
property that emerges from the Thomistic-Aristotelian natural law
tradition. These theories cover a wide range of philosophical approaches.
Most takings theories, even those not expressly included in this
discussion, will find themselves closely aligned with at least one of the
154
theories discussed.
A.

Takings and Liberty

One of the most persistent theories of private property is the
libertarian position that posits an essential link between private
ownership and individual liberty. 55 Indeed, this liberal-libertarian vision
of property was central to the worldview of the drafters of the
Constitution.156 Such a vision roots the moral imperative for private
property in the nature of the individual and in the need to guarantee a
sphere of autonomy within which the individual can operate. This view
would consider uncompensated takings, whether through regulation or
eminent domain, an affront to the natural rights of the individual and a
grave threat to individual liberty.
A variety of theories might be understood as advocating a libertybased justification for private property. For example, both Epstein's
conservative theory of property and Radin's more progressive, Hegelian
personhood-based theory of property, could be characterized as positing
a link between private property and individual autonomy.157 In this
discussion, however, I will treat Radin's Hegelian theory and the
libertarian theories, like Epstein's, as belonging to separate species,
examining libertarian theories in this Section and Radin's theory in the
154. Though each of the theories has its own particular strengths and weaknesses, the goal
of this Article is not to present comprehensive arguments for or against any of them. Nor does
this Article present a thorough philosophical analysis of every implication of each of the
theories. The aim instead is to explore their implications for, and to assess their claims about, the
distinction between land and personal property in the regulatory takings context.
155.

See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).

156. See NEDELSKY, supra note 134, at 170-78 (noting the dominant role of liberalism in the
creation of the American Constitution and observing that, for Madison, "[p]roperty derived
much of its value from its relation to freedom"). Of course, the liberal tradition is not the only
one within American property law. Republican strains of thought, rooted in pre-modern
traditions that tend to emphasize the relationship between property and virtue, have remained
vital within the American discussion of property. See id. (noting the republican influences on the
Constitution); see also GREGORY ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING
VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at 1-7 (1999); Rose, supra

note 1, at 587-94.
157. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 290 (1988).
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next. I distinguish between these two theories based on a conceptual
difference in the way the theories understand the notion of "freedom."
The crucial difference lies in the time-worn, though still meaningful,
distinction between liberty conceived of in the "positive" sense as the
"freedom to" do certain things, and liberty in the "negative" sense as
"freedom from" outside intrusion.' 58When Hegelians talk about freedom
and liberty, they appear to mean freedom to engage in activities necessary
for the full realization of a human being's free will.' 59 Such a positive
conception of human freedom generates a redistributive impulse within
Hegelian property thought. 6 ' In contrast to this positive conception of
human freedom is the more negative libertarian understanding of
freedom as freedom from outside, particularly governmental,
interference. 61 This negative approach emphasizes the right to be left
alone and is generally comfortable with existing property distributions.
Indeed, it views attempts to forcibly redistribute, except under certain
16
narrow circumstances, as grave threats to personal liberty. 2
This discussion evaluates three strands of libertarian argument for
the special status of land. First, this Section asseses Robert Ellickson's
argument that land is somehow uniquely necessary for the preservation
of individual liberty. Second, it explores the related notion that
landownership is inextricably bound up with the American Dream of
homeownership. Finally, the section discusses the connection between
landownership and sovereignty.
1.

Ellickson's Arguments For the Primacy of Land

The negative liberal-libertarian conception of liberty appears to offer
a particularly strong basis for protecting land more vigorously than
personal property from government regulation.'63 Robert Ellickson, for

158.

See ALEXANDER, supra note 156, at 2-3.

159. See GEORG W. F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 44-45 (T. Knox trans. 1942);
WALDRON, supra note 157, at 353 (observing that Hegel thought that "individuals need private
property in order to sustain and develop the abilities and self-conceptions definitive of their
status as persons"); Peter G. Stillman, Property, Freedom and Individuality in Hegel and Marx's
Political Thought, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY, at 130, 132 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman, eds., 1980) ("[Plroperty for Hegel is essential for men if they are to lead a full life of
reason.").
160. Hegel himself did not fully appreciate the redistributive impulses generated by his
theory of property. See WALDRON, supra note 157, at 378-80. Nonetheless, his theory lends itself
to strongly redistributive arguments. See id. at 381-86.
161. See NEDELSKY, supra note 134, at 172-73 (discussing Lance Banning, Jeffersonian
Ideology, 43 WM. & MARY 0. 3, 18 (1986)).
162. See NOZICK, supra note 28, at 149-64.
163. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1344 (1993) ("Classical
liberals, for example, regard private property in land as an essential instrument for promoting
political freedom, privacy, and self-determination.").
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example, has made the following three-part argument regarding the
primacy of land in securing individual liberty:
Compared to other resources, land remains a particularly potent
safeguard of individual liberty. Like no other resource, land can
provide a physical haven to which a beleaguered individual can
retreat. A land sanctuary directly serves a variety of so-called
'negative' liberties. First, when a society confers self-ownership of
labor, as most do, private land-ownership helps to ensure economic
independence. In the United States, more than 75% of wealth takes
the form of human capital-entitlement to work for oneself or to sell
one's labor. Whenever a landowner can credibly threaten to withdraw
into self-employment on his own land, private property in land helps
to protect a worker from overreaching by employers or state officials.
This realization may have underlain Jefferson's wish for a polity of
farmers. Today, back-to-nature agriculturalists, cottage artisans, and
hermits are among those who use land as a refuge.
Second, some social scientists assert that human beings have an innate
desire to control their own environment, and may even be innately
territorial. To the extent that these traits exist-an issue that is highly
contested-private property in land best serves them.
Third, and finally, an individual landowner's right to exclude directly
enhances rights of privacy1'64
Ellickson sets forth three distinct arguments for the unique
importance of land within a liberty theory of property: (1) landownership
as both a necessary and (when combined with self-ownership of labor)
sufficient condition for individual self-sufficiency; (2) landownership as
satisfying a possible innate territorial urge within human nature; and (3)
landownership, including the right to exclude, as enhancing the right to
privacy. Taken as arguments for the primacy of landownership over other
forms of property, 65 the second and third points are most easily
dispatched. I will therefore address those two points first, before moving
on to Ellickson's first, and most persuasive, argument.
The notion that landownership satisfies an innate territorial instinct
could only justify a preference for property in land if the territorial
instinct to which Ellickson refers is somehow more important or
fundamental than the other instincts whose satisfaction depends upon
other forms of property. For example, private enjoyment of food is
164. Id. at 1353.
165. In fairness to Ellickson, it appears from the context of this passage within his larger
article on the ownership of land that this discussion is primarily oriented towards establishing the
importance of private ownership of land over other forms of land tenure. That is, it is not
principally intended to establish that the ownership of land is more important to liberty than the
ownership of personal property. It appears, however, that Ellickson did intend to make the latter
point as well as the former. See id. ("Compared to other resources, land remains a particularly
potent safeguard of individual liberty.").
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necessary to the satisfaction of a human instinct for self-preservation.
Moreover, Hegelians view private property as satisfying a basic human
need to develop a rational and autonomous will.1" Without an argument
as to why Ellickson's territorial instinct is somehow more fundamental
than these (and other) instincts that are best (or only) satisfied by
personal property, the mere existence of such a territorial instinct cannot
serve as the basis for prioritizing land over personal property.'6 7
Ellickson's argument that landownership is uniquely important to
the preservation of liberty because it enhances a person's enjoyment of
the right to privacy is also unpersuasive. To begin with, at least with
respect to the government (the entity with which proponents of
"negative" liberty are chiefly concerned), it is unclear what calling land
"property" adds to a person's enjoyment of privacy."6 Requiring the
government to respect individual privacy would seem sufficient to
guarantee the enjoyment of that right as against the state, irrespective of
the formal status of the piece of earth on which that right is enjoyed.169
More broadly, however, there is a latent circularity in Ellickson's
reasoning. On Ellickson's view, private ownership of land is constituted
in substantial part by the right to exclude. 7 ° Conversely, the privacy right
Ellickson says is enhanced by private ownership is merely the right to be
left alone by excluding others from a particular physical space."'
Ellickson asserts that private ownership of land is important because it
enhances the individual's right to privacy. In other words, Ellickson says
that granting people the right to exclude is important because it enhances
their enjoyment of the right to exclude. To make his argument more
normatively compelling, Ellickson must explain what significance private
ownership of land (as opposed to other resources) has for some
independent account of human well-being more broadly and why
landownership bears more of a connection to the realization of that wellbeing than ownership of other forms of property.
Ellickson appears to make just such a move with his argument that
ownership of land is uniquely important to liberty because it provides the
owner with an exit option from a life among the hurly burly of society. In

166.
167.

See infra notes 220-221 and accompanying text.
There are reasons for doubting that such an innate need for individual landownership

actually exists or, if it does, that it is only satisfied by private ownership of land. After all,
landownership is a fairly recent phenomenon in the history of the human species. See, e.g.,
THOMPSON, supra note 117, § 14.03, at 181 (Supp. 1999) (noting that "[p]rimitive people
recognized property rights in weapons, tools, pottery, clothing and livestock long before they

contemplated realty as an object of ownership.").
168. See Bromley, supra note 124, at 25.
169.

Cf ALEXANDER, supra note 156, at 377 (suggesting that the concept of property, by

itself, does little to secure individual rights).
170. See Ellickson, supra note 163, at 1324, 1363.
171.

See id. at 1353-54.
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full possession of his labor, which, Ellickson asserts, constitutes the bulk
of his net worth, the lone property owner can retreat to his land and
provide for himself. Land thus serves both as a refuge from others and as
a conceptual check on abuse by third parties, public and private. This is
an argument that historically has resonated deeply with the libertarian
tradition in American property thought." 2
Though this argument may accomplish many things, it cannot
establish the primacy of property in land over other forms of property for
protecting individual liberty. Assuming that a person could retreat to his
land to make a living on the basis of his "human capital," ' Ellickson's
argument would, at best, establish that land is a necessary condition for
such liberty. Land could not, however, be a sufficient condition because it
would be impossible for the reclusive self-employed to put his human
capital to use without the benefit of personal property. The lawyer must
have her books (or computer), the farmer his implements, and the artisan
her tools. And we must all have food and clothing. Even the shelters in
which landowners live and work were personal property before they were
affixed to the land.'74 Thus, were the private ownership of personal
property not secure, private ownership of land would provide little of the
independence Ellickson values.
Ellickson's self-sufficient landowners recall the image of the yeoman
farmer, in whom Jefferson put such faith.175 Very few such farmers still
exist. 76 Furthermore, even the small farmers who remain are not selfreliant survivalists living off the land. They buy and sell their inputs and
produce (both of which are personal property) on the open market and
often receive substantial private and government assistance."7 Moreover,

172. See SCOTT. supra note 128, at 53-54 (noting the connection in early American
libertarian thought between landownership, economic self-sufficiency, and political liberty).
173. The model of land on which Ellickson's particular argument depends-land as a refuge
to which sturdy individuals retreat to a self-sufficient life apart from society-is intrinsically
implausible. Whether or not most wealth in this country consists of "human capital," that human
capital only has value in relation to a larger marketplace, made up of other individuals,
corporations, the government, etc., in which the individual must participate to obtain the income
she needs to survive. Thus, if private ownership of land is to constitute a source of liberty, its
ability to serve such a role cannot be based upon its tendency to enable its owner to live selfsufficiently. The question of how private ownership creates the conditions for liberty is beyond
the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, my own view is that private ownership (whether of land or
personal property seems somewhat less important) is necessary for a person to generate the
subjective experience of liberty and responsibility that, in turn, makes a person (and, collectively,
a society) more likely to value-and therefore to protect-institutions that guarantee liberty. See
Carol M. Rose, Propter Honoris Respectum: Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 329, 364-65 (1996).
174. THOMPSON, supra note 117, § 14.03 at 182 (Supp. 1999), § 13.02(b) at 225 (1994).
175. Ellickson, supra note 163, at 1353.
176. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
177. Over half of farm operators in the United States derive substantial income from wage
labor off the farm. See Economic Research Service of the United States Department of
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even for Ellickson's "back-to-nature agriculturalists, cottage artisans, and
hermits," "78ownership of a small farm would be worthless without secure
ownership of the personal property necessary to work that farm. Finally,
at least some of their productive endeavors are likely to be aimed toward
the acquisition of personal property (food, clothing, building materials,
toys, savings, etc.) for which human beings strive and by which we (at
least those of us living in modern Western societies) in large part measure
our material wellbeing. While it is eminently reasonable to think that the
institution of private property is related to liberty, the private property
conducive to liberty necessarily includes both land and personal

property."'
In addition to the conceptual arguments against the notion that land

is uniquely connected to liberty, historical arguments demonstrate the
declining significance of landownership in a modern capitalist economy.
As numerous scholars have observed, the modern economy is
characterized by the increasing importance of non-land wealth,
particularly intangible property, such as intellectual property and
government largess."s The small farmer is a dying breed in the United
States."' According to census data, less than one percent of the U.S.

population is engaged in farming as a primary occupation. 82 Even in rural

Agriculture,
Farm
Income
And
Costs:
Farm
Household
Income,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Farmlncome/forenew.htm (last updated Feb. 6, 2004).
178. Ellickson, supra note 163, at 1353.
179. See Charles A. Reisch, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771-72, 787 (1964)
(arguing that private property "draws a circle around the activities of each private individual and
organization" inside of which the owner is granted "a greater degree of freedom" and suggesting
that the space inside the circle must include more than just land). This Article's argument is
unrelated to Reisch's point about the need for property-like protections of government largess in
the modern welfare state. At all times, personal property is necessary to a person's enjoyment of
the benefits, however characterized, of private ownership of land. Thus, to the extent that such
enjoyment generates, or is constitutive of, liberty, private ownership of personal property enjoys
equal credit with private ownership of land.
180. See ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 166 ("Unlike our ancestors, we no longer count our
wealth by looking first to our social property of land, farms, buildings. Instead, our principal
means of support consist of legal property: stocks, bonds, pensions, an assortment of rights
granted by the activist welfare state."); ALEXANDER, supra note 156, at 259 (observing that with
the urbanization of America, land has "increasingly lost its role as the socially and economically
dominant form of property"); Bosselman, supra note 24; WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGUALTORY
TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 278-79 (1995); Geisler, supra note 128, at 542;
Reisch, supra note 179; Bernard Rudden, Things as Things and Things as Wealth, 14 OXFORD J.
LEGAL. STUD. 81, 82 (1994); SCOTT, supra note 128, at 75-93, 133-35, 201-02.
181. Geisler, supra note 128, at 533 ("The battle waged a century ago by the Populists to
preserve an agrarian democracy built on broad distribution of private ownership among small
holders seems to have been lost.").
182. See United States Census, Occupation, Industry, and Class of Worker of Employed
Civilians 16 Years and Over: 2000, Census 2000 Summary File 3, Table No. GCT-P13, available
from http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2002/sumfile3.html.
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areas, only 7.6 percent of employment is in agriculture.'83 Were the fate of
liberty dependent on the survival of such a lifestyle, these would indeed
be frightening statistics. Although the prevalence of small farmers in the
early republic may well have made it plausible for men like Thomas
Jefferson to see an essential connection between such forms of
landownership and liberty," the apparent survival of our liberties despite
the disappearance of small-scale agriculture should at least give pause to
contemporary adherents of that position.
Ellickson's libertarian account of the importance of land is thus
ultimately unconvincing. It is far from clear that private landownership is
necessary for the satisfaction of deeply-held human desires in a way that
personal property is not. Nor is it clear that the protection of property in
land adds anything to the direct protection of an individual right to
privacy. Finally, the libertarian ideal of the self-sufficient individual alone
on his land depends at least as much on the private enjoyment of personal
property as it does on private property in land.
2.

Liberty and the American Dream

Whether or not landownership is uniquely necessary to Ellickson's
self-sufficient recluses, and regardless of whether land has declined as a
source of income for most Americans, no one could reasonably deny that
landownership remains particularly important to Americans because of
its unparalleled role in the mythology of our culture. After all, is it not
every American's dream to own her own home? Is it not therefore the
case that this American Dream is intrinsically tied to ownership of land?
As Sonia Solamon has pointed out, "[a]mong urban and suburban
populations, a home (that combines land with a dwelling) represents
achievement of the American Dream in the same way as does control of
farmland in rural areas."' 85 But while landownership is, as a practical
matter, necessary to the achievement of the American Dream, it is not
sufficient by itself to realize the American dream.
Homeownership certainly confers substantial status within our
society." 6 Consider the cultural implications of landownership, for
183. See Economic Research Service, U.S.D.A., UnderstandingRural America, AG. INFO.
BULL. No. 710, at 12 (1995).
184. See supra note 136.
185. Sonya Salamon, Cultural Dimensions of Land Tenure in the United States, in WHO
OWNS AMERICA?, supra note 124, at 159, 174-75: see also JAN COHN, THE PALACE OR THE
POORHOUSE: THE AMERICAN HOME AS A CULTURAL SYMBOL 223 (1979) ("[Fjor the majority
of Americans, house and home coexist; home flourishes most successfully in the privately
owned, detached single-family dwelling.").
186. See CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING INITS PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND LAND USE
IN AMERICA 32 (1977) ("In American society, the form of tenure -whether a household owns or
rents its place of residence-is read as a primary social sign, used in categorizing and evaluating
people, in much the same way that race, income, occupation, and education are.").
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example, by comparing the status of the owners of single-family dwellings
to life-long apartments renters and the residents of mobile home parks.
Yet while ownership of land has significant symbolic value within the
context of American culture, for a variety of reasons, personal property is
also necessary to the realization of the American Dream.
As already suggested, homeownership goes well beyond the mere
ownership of land and would be meaningless without personal property.
To begin with, the home itself is made up of personal property, such as
bricks and wood, affixed to the land."' Although such "fixtures" are
technically "real property," they were personal property before being
joined with the land. Lack of access to personal property (e.g., paint,
plaster, wood, tools) needed to maintain such fixtures inevitably results in
their destruction. Anyone who has visited Havana in the years since the
collapse of the Soviet Union will immediately appreciate the dire
consequences for structures that can result from lack of access to personal
property, such as construction materials."8 In addition to being
constructed out of personal property, the house is a "home" in large part
because of the personal property contained within it: furniture,
appliances, photographs, clothing, and much more. Thus, access to
personal property-not just land-is necessary to realize the American
dream. Indeed, the bulk of the persuasive work done by the American
dream argument may be performed by personal property attached to and
placed on land.
A thought experiment might help to convey the limits of the
importance of land within our mythology of homeownership. Consider
the example of houseboats. Houseboats can be just like houses built on
land in all relevant respects except that they float and are moored to a
dock instead of sitting on a foundation dug into the earth."9 In cities like
Seattle, houseboats are a desirable sort of home, commanding a
significant premium over the market price of comparably-sized dwellings
built on land."9 The homes are attached to docks, which homeowners
may either lease or own, often through cooperative or condominium

187. See supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Se derrumba un edificio durante una fiesta de quince ahos, CUBANET
INDEPENDIENTE, Dec. 5, 2000, at (http://64.21.33.164/CNews/yOO/decOO/O5a9.htm) (describing
the collapse of a private home in Havana, Cuba during a birthday party and noting the general
deterioration of private homes in Havana due to the lack of access to construction materials).
189. See Ann Sloper, Houseboats: Catch the Wave, in THE SEATTLE PRESS, available at
http://www.seattlepress.com/article-9123.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
190. See Sloper, supra note 189. In 2002, based on a sampling of ten houseboats for sale on
Lake Union, the median price was $375,000, see id., as compared to a median price of $313,000
for land-based homes in Seattle in 2003. See Rachel Tuinstra, Voters Backing Levy to Rebuild,
Renovate City's Fire Stations, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 5, 2003, at A13.
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arrangements, but are otherwise unconnected to the earth. 9' As such,
they remain personal property.'92
A comparison between a well-appointed houseboat and a normal,
land-based home yields few meaningful differences. Unlike mobile
homes, houseboats do not suffer from any stigma of poverty. The
question, then, is what does ownership of land add to the equation?
Though landownership may add some conveniences (a yard, for
example), it is difficult to argue that the two types of dwellings are
essentially different. Owning a houseboat would satisfy, and even exceed,
the American Dream for the vast majority of Americans. Finally,
compare the houseboat with an undeveloped piece of land. It is clear that
the houseboat comes much closer to satisfying the American Dream than
93
mere landownership.
The point here is not that landownership adds nothing to the
American Dream of homeownership. Land may offer some sense of
permanence that a houseboat lacks. Moreover, given the scarcity of
shorefront space, land-based homes are necessary if more than a small
number of people are to enjoy homeownership. As a result,
landownership is, as a practical matter, a necessity for the satisfaction of
the American Dream by more than just a token number of people. 9 4 But
landownership is not a conceptual necessity. As the case of houseboats
demonstrates, landownership, as such, contributes far less to the
American Dream than often assumed. The bulk of the American Dream
is satisfied by the structure of the house, which was once-and in the case
of houseboats still is-personal property, by the home's contents (again
personal property), and by the social status and financial benefits

191. As a result of an ordinance passed in 1907, a number of houseboat-owners along the
Lake Union shoreline in Seattle own the submerged land underlying their floating homes. See
http://www.discoverhouseboating.comi/trivia.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2004). For the purposes of
this thought experiment, however, the reader should assume that no such ownership exists.
192. The value of houseboats in Seattle is taxed as personal property. See id.; CAL. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 22, § 50425 (listing "houseboats" as a form of "personal property" that may serve as a
principal residence).
193. There may have been a time when immigrants came to the United States primarily to
take advantage of the opportunity to own economically productive land. See Harvey M. Jacobs,
The "Wisdom," but Uncertain Future, of the Wise Use Movement, in WHO OWNS AMERICA?,
supra note 124, at 29, 36; SCOTT, supra note 128, at 6-9 (describing the opportunity for
landownership as a substantial inducement for colonists to emigrate from Europe to colonial
America). Under such circumstances, conclusions about the substance of the "American
Dream" would have tilted more in favor of mere landownership. As the statistics on the number
of Americans making their living from farming indicate, however, those days are tong gone. See
supra note 182 and accompanying text. Moreover, even under such a land-focused conception of
the American Dream, personal property has a necessary role to play in the productive use of the
land.
194. In Bromley's words, landownership increasingly provides little more than "space and
place." See Bromley, supra note 124, at 27.
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associated with homeownership. 5 The American Dream is at least as
intimately connected with personal property as it is with land.196
Attempts to ground the Court's favoritism toward land in the
American Dream of homeownership also confront the problem that a
blanket rule in favor of landowners is a dramatically over-inclusive tool
for protecting the homeowners. Land for homes represents less than five
percent of the total land in the United States and less than ten percent of
all privately owned land. 97 Around three quarters of the land in the
United States is cropland, grazing land, or forestland, 9 8 and that land is

owned by very few people.1" Indeed, the top one half of one percent of
landowners, including corporations, owns forty percent of the privately
held land in the United States; in contrast, the bottom three quarters of
American landowners own just three percent of the private land.2"° A
blanket rule in favor of land built on the need to protect the American
Dream would thus constitute an enormous windfall to a small number of
highly concentrated, and primarily nonresidential, landowners.
Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that homeowners have not been the
forefront of a property-rights movement focused on the protection of
land."1 As Alfred Olivetti and Jeff Worsham observed in their study of
195. See Salamon. supra note 185, at 162. As the case of houseboats demonstrates, however,
these side-benefits of home-ownership are not exclusively connected to the ownership of land as
such.
196. It might be tempting to argue that the favored position of land within regulatory
takings law includes the personal property attached to land. Ironically, although homeownership
arguably might provide strong rhetorical support for a rule favoring land (at least if land is
considered in a broad sense as including the personal property attached to the land), the
Supreme Court's favoritism towards land, at least in Lucas, is focused on land in the narrow
sense. In Lucas, the Court indicated that a regulation could render a structure attached to the
land useless-and valueless-without constituting a per se taking; only a regulation that
deprived an owner of all economically beneficial uses of the underlying land would constitute a
per se taking. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 & n.13 (1992)
(distinguishing Mugler, Reinman, and Hadacheck on the ground that the regulations at issue in
those cases did not "wholly eliminate[] the value of the claimant's land" (emphasis added)).
197. See National Association of Realtors, Land Use and Land Loss in the United States
(2001) (on file with author); Marlow Vesterby & Kenneth S. Krupa, Resource Economics
Division, Economic Research Service, U.S.D.A., Major Uses of Land in the United States,
STATISTICAL
BULLETIN.
No.
973,
at
22
(1997),
available
at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/sb973/. Indeed, the five percent figure is itself overinclusive, because it includes within it land that has been developed for commercial uses.
198. See Vesterby & Krupa, supra note 197, at 22.
199 See Harvey M. Jacobs, Conclusion: Who Owns America? in WHO OWNS AMERICA,
supra note 124, at 245, 247 (observing that five percent of the U.S. population owns seventy-five
percent of the private land base).
200. See Vesterby & Krupa, supra note 197, at 22-23; see also Geisler, supra note 128, at
533. Roughly sixty percent of the land in the United States is privately owned. See id. Such
concentrations of landownership are, according to Geisler, "comparable to [concentrations
found in] many Third-World countries." See Geisler, supra note 128, at 539.
201. See ALFRED M. OLIVETTI, JR. & JEFF WORSHAM, THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND, THIS
LAND IS MY LAND: THE PROPERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND REGULATORY TAKINGS 38-44

(2003). Indeed, it is in the very states where landownership is most concentrated and where non-
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the property-rights movement, its agenda has been spearheaded by
"western agriculture and mineral interests, joined and funded by
multinationals involved in extractive mineral industries. ' 2 2 Although the
movement often draws support from libertarian principles, the propertyrights movement that has formed around these land-using enterprises has
not sought to expand property rights for purely abstract, philosophical
reasons. Rather, motivated by concrete economic interests, it has pursued
the very practical and relatively narrow goal of blunting the force of
(primarily environmental) land-use regulations on its members' ability to
23
exploit the land as freely and profitably as they have in the past.
In pursuit of that goal, the property-rights movement has focused on
requiring government compensation for regulations that affect its favored
uses of land. This narrow focus on land-use regulation is reflected in the
compensation statutes enacted at the behest of property-rights advocates.
Those statutes, which generally call for compensation to be paid to
property owners whose property value has declined by a specified
amount because of government regulation, have invariably defined
"property" to include only property in land. Florida's compensation
statute, for example, applies by its plain language only to "real
property."2" Mississippi's is limited even more narrowly to "forest and
agricultural land."2 And Texas's compensation statute applies only to
"private real property."2" Similarly, Oregon's compensation initiative,
Measure 7, which was invalidated by the Oregon Supreme Court, limited
compensation to "real property."2"
In sum, the American Dream depends as much on personal property
as it does on land. Moreover, a rule granting favored status for land in
order to protect homeowners, would be grossly over-inclusive because it
would apply to all land, even though the vast majority of the privately
owned land in this country has nothing to do with homeownership.2 8 The
mythology of the American Dream therefore offers little support for
categorical favoritism towards land in regulatory takings jurisprudence.

residential uses of land predominate that the property-rights movement has found its greatest
support. See id.; see also Geisler, supra note 128, at 539-40; Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P.
Lord, The Takings Project: A CriticalAnalysis and Assessment of the ProgressSo Far, 25 B.C.

ENVr'L AFF. L. REV. 509, 529-30 (1998) (arguing that "the Takings Project had little to do with
protecting individual landowners" and more to do with combating commercial regulation).
202. OLIVETTI & WORSHAM,supra note 197, at 39-42; see Kendall & Lord, supra note 201,
at 529-30.

203.
204.

See OLIVETII & WORSHAM,supra note 197, at 37-39.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001 (West 2004).

205.
206.
207.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-33-1 (2003).
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2007.002 (Vernon 2003).
See League of Or. Cities v. State, 56 P.3d 892, 910-11 (Or. 2002).

208.

The assumption that justifies differential treatment of individual homeownership would

also appear to support only a rule in favor of land owned by individuals.
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Liberty and Sovereignty

In contrast to the fundamentally individualistic notion of land as
uniquely essential to liberty, a different conceptualization of the
connection between land and liberty views land as necessary for the
maintenance of communal sovereignty."° From this perspective, land is
uniquely capable of defining communal boundaries, providing
communities with a geographic space within which to carry on their
political and cultural life freely. This argument has been made most
forcefully in the context of Native American tribes, 210 but could just as
easily be extended to sovereigns of other sorts, such as states and
municipalities.
Territorial boundaries define the limits of a sovereign's political
power, whether that sovereign is a tribe, city, or state. Deprivations of
property rights in land, whether by eminent domain or by regulation,
therefore may represent particularly grave threats to the political and
cultural autonomy of sovereigns. Infringements on that territorial
integrity arguably strike at the heart of the sovereign in a way that
deprivation or regulation of personal property does not.
As with the American Dream, this argument disregards the essential
role of personal property in the everyday functions of both individual and
communal life. While regulation or deprivation of land certainly affects
the sovereign in a powerful way, regulation of personal property may do
equal violence. Withholding personal property through an embargo or
blockade constitutes a powerful tool for coercing a sovereign without
infringing its territorial integrity.
Moreover, for some communities, such as Native American tribes,
the preservation of cultural activities constitutes a principal value of
sovereignty.2"2 Depriving those soveriengs of the personal property
necessary for the conduct of their cultural traditions (for example, the
peyote used in the cultural practices of certain indigenous communities)

209. See Padraic I. McCoy, The Land Must Hold the People: Native Modes of Territoriality
and Contemporary Tribal Justificationsfor Placing Land into Trust Through 25 C.ER. Part 151,
27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421, 422-45 (2003) ("[L]and-especially protected tribal trust landsustains and shields Indian communities physically, culturally, and spiritually.").
210. See id. at 424-25 ("Native Americans and tribes share a meaningful and culturally
significant connection to land far exceeding western notions of land and property typically held
by non-Indians.").
211. Although the Takings Clause refers only to "private property," see U.S. CONST. amend,
V, the courts have consistently required the federal government to compensate state and local
governments and Indian tribes for takings of their property. See Schill, supra note 153, at 830-31;
see also Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 277 (1955) ("Where the Congress by
treaty or other agreement has declared that thereafter Indians were to hold the lands
permanently, compensation must be paid for subsequent taking.").
212. See McCoy, supra note 209, at 424-25,435-36.
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diminishes the value of their sovereignty just as surely as depriving them
of the land on which to carry out those traditions. 213
The sovereignty argument fails for two additional reasons. First, it
gives the false impression that ownership of land, by itself, can confer
sovereignty separate from the direct protection of sovereign prerogatives.
Without a preexisting commitment to respect communal sovereignty,
naked landownership provides scant protection.214 Second, as with
homeownership, assigning a privileged status to all land in order to
protect domestic sovereigns from depredations on their territorial
integrity, is vastly over-protective. The great majority of American land is
privately owned,21 5 and the bulk of publicly owned land is held by the
federal government, not by subsidiary sovereigns in need of protection."'
State and local government land accounts for only nine percent of
American land; tribal trust land represents just two percent." 7 The desire
to protect sovereignty therefore presents a poor reason for favoring all
land over other forms of property.
To summarize, land alone cannot secure individual liberty or
communal sovereignty, and it cannot satisfy the American Dream.
Moreover, the land involved in the pursuit of such goals is a relatively
small percentage of the land in the United States. Accordingly,
libertarian considerations do not support favoritism towards land as such
within the law of regulatory takings.
B.

Takings and Personhood

Personhood theories of takings likewise fail to supply a basis for the
Court's favoritism toward landowners. Such theories ground their
arguments for private ownership in the relationship between exclusive
control over items in the material world and the development of the self.
The most prominent recent proponent of such a theory is Margaret
Radin, whose theory of property builds on the insights of Georg Hegel's
Philosophyof Right.21

Radin's (and Hegel's) theory justifies private ownership on the basis
of its essential connection to the formation and maintenance of a person's
autonomy and "personhood." 2t 9 At its most basic level, property is
necessary for the development of a person's will because by imposing his
213.
214.

See Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. of Or.v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
See Nevada v.Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).

215. See Versterby & Krupa, supra note 197, at 23.
216. See id. (noting that the federal government owns twenty-eight percent of land in
America).
217.
218.

(1982).
219.

See id.
See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 977-78

See id. at 977-79; Stillman, supra note 159, at 137-40.
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will on material objects over an extended period of time, through his
powers of appropriation and ownership, a person accomplishes three
things essential to his moral development: first, his autonomous will is
manifested in a meaningful way in the world; second, his will is made
more rational and, third, his free will is recognized by others.22 A
person's will is manifested in the material world by his sheer
manipulation of material objects-in moving an object from one place to
another, or in changing the form of an object in some way, a person
makes the material world the object of his will, and in the process, leaves
the mark of his will on the world itself. Private property helps to make a
person's will more rational by enabling him to plan future use of his
material possessions. Such planning allows a person's will to become
more rational through the need to think prudentially about how certain
manipulations of property will yield the particular results that the person
desires over time. Finally, private property allows a person's will to be
recognized by others who observe a person's physical manipulation and
respect that person's superior rights over privately owned objects.221
Radin draws upon Hegel's understanding of the role of private
property for personal development to posit a theory in which some
categories of property are more important than others.222 Specifically,
Radin argues that property lying closer to the core of an individual's selfdefinition, such as the home, is more worthy of legal protection than
more peripheral property, such as speculative investment property.223
Though such a hierarchical conception of property rights might seem
promising for the Court's distinction between land and personal property,
Radin's theory, and personhood theories generally, turn out to be
particularly unhelpful.
Radin's conception of property does not explain the Court's
favoritism for land in regulatory takings because it acknowledges the
deep connections between an individual's self-conception and her
personal property. For example, Radin discusses at length the connection
between an individual and her car. The car is both an instrumental tool
and a mobile physical environment in which we store our personal

220.
221.

See WALDRON, supra note 157, at 373-77.
See id. 353-57, 372-75; Stillman, supra note 159, at 136-40.

222.
223.

See Radin, supra note 218, at 978-79, 986-88.
See id. at 986-88. As Radin acknowledges, without some objective check on the

reasonability of certain self-conceptions, personhood theories are open to the challenge that they
allow for infinite subjectivism in the valuing of property. See id. at 968-70. In subsequent articles,

Radin appears to have embraced the Aristotelian notion of "human flourishing" as the basis for
such an objective, external check. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1849 (1987); see also Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross
Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1694-95 (1988) ("[T]he

'compleat capitalist' embodies an inferior conception of human flourishing, and one we should
reject.").
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' 22
belongings and "carry[] on private thoughts or intimate relationships.
She analogizes the car to the home and argues that cars should be given,
at least for some purposes, the same legal protections currently reserved
for dwellings. 225 In the takings context, Radin argues for stronger legal
protection of property that is more central to a person's identity, whether
that property is personal or real.2 26 "[I]f someone returns home to find
her sofa has disappeared," Radin says, "that is more disorienting than to
discover that her house has decreased in market value by 5%. If, by
magic, her white sofa were instantly displaced by a blue one of equal
market value, it would cause no loss in net worth but would still cause
'
some disruption in her life."227
Radin's respect for personal property is not an accidental feature of
her particular version of personhood theory. If the institution of private
property is rooted in our need to manipulate objects in the external world
in order to form a free and rational will, personal property is at the heart
of that property system. After all, personal property is far easier to
manipulate than land. Moreover, when a person does manipulate land,
she can only do so (in any meaningful way) through the use of tools and
other items of personal property. Finally, although land plays an
important role in our self-identity, that role is at a minimum matched in
importance by the personal property people wrap around their bodies
and carry with them through society. The personhood theory of property
simply cannot supply the basis for the Court's distinction between
personal property and land.

C.

Takings and Utility

Like libertarian explanations, utilitarian theories abound in the
academic discussion of takings law. 8 Although economists generally
reject the economic significance of the categorical distinction between
personal property and land,229 the distinction might serve as a useful
224.
225.
226.

See Radin, supra note 218, at 1000-01.
See id.
See id. at 1004.

227.

See id.

228. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 6; Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 591-92 (1984); Lewis
Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions,99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 549 & n.86 (1986);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 64 (5"' ed. 1998); Michael A. Heller &

James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 999
(1999): Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Sergerson, Reguatory Takings: When Should
Compensation Be Paid?, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 749, 758-59 (1994); Robert Cooter, Utility in Tort,
Contract,and Property: The Model of Precaution,73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1985); Schill, supra
note 153, at 859-60.
229. See Bosselman, supra note 24, at 39 ("Economic theory now recognizes no basic
distinction between land and other forms of capital.") (citing Daniel W. Bromley, Regulatory
Takings: Coherent Concept or Logical Contradiction?, 17 VT. L. REV. 647, 677-78 (1993));
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proxy for some other characteristic that utilitarians do find significant.
Consequently, it is worth considering the distinction from the point of
view of the dominant utilitarian theory of takings, the theory put forward
by Frank Michelman in his landmark 1967 article in the Harvard Law
Review.23 ° This Section begins by sketching the outlines of Michelman's
theory and then questions whether the theory justifies a distinction
between land and personal property.
Michelman builds his theory out of the interaction of three concepts:
efficiency gains, demoralization costs, and settlement costs. Efficiency
gains are "the excess of benefits produced by a measure over losses
inflicted by" that measure. Michaelman defines benefits as "the total
number of dollars which prospective gainers would be willing to pay to
secure adoption."231Losses are "the total number of dollars which
'
prospective losers would insist on as the price of agreeing to adoption." 232
"Demoralization costs" are defined as the value of "disutilities"
(which in this context can be thought of as losses, including unhappiness
or subjective dissatisfaction) that would result if the government were to
adopt a policy without compensating the losers.233 Demoralization costs
also include the value of lost future production caused by the
demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathizers, and other
observers disturbed by the government's actions.2" Finally, "settlement
costs" are the value of the "time, effort, and resources which would be
required in order to reach compensation settlements adequate to avoid
demoralization costs."23
For Michelman, the goal of takings law is to maximize overall social
welfare. He concludes that the government should only pursue a policy if
the efficiency gains it will generate would exceed either the
demoralization costs or the settlement costs necessary to avoid
demoralization costs.236 Once it opts to pursue the policy, the government
should "pay" either the settlement costs or the demoralization costs,

Jacobs, supra note 199, at 245, 247-48 (observing that classical economic theory recognizes land
as an important factor of production but arguing that "as capitalism has matured over the course
of the last one-hundred years, and especially in the last twenty-five years, land seems to be ever
more irrelevant").
230. Michelman's article actually sets forth two theories of takings, one rooted in utilitarian
considerations and one applying Rawls' contractarian ethical theory. See Michelman, supra note
29, at 1214-1224. My focus will be on the utilitarian version of his thesis, which has generated
more scholarly interest.
231. Id. at 1214.
232. Id..
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1215.
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whichever is lower.23 7 The question here is whether government action
affecting land is likely to impact "efficiency gains," "demoralization
costs," or "settlement costs" in ways that differ systematically from the
impacts caused by government action affecting property generally. That
is, does this utilitarian approach support the Lucas Court's distinction
between land and personal property?
1.

Efficiency Gains

Of Michelman's three concepts, efficiency gains are most closely
related to the standard economic analysis performed by welfare
economists.3 Given economists' failure to distinguish between land and
personal property in their work,239 it seems unlikely that the regulation of
the two categories of property would have systematically different effects
on efficiency gains.
2.

DemoralizationCosts

Demoralization costs, the disutilities caused by the government's
failure to compensate for losses sustained because of a particular
government action affecting property, are a highly subjective measure.2 4°
Whether the notion of demoralization costs justifies the Court's
differential treatment of land and personal property depends on whether
individuals' subjective reaction to the uncompensated taking of land is
likely to differ from their reaction to the uncompensated taking of
personal property. Moreover, it depends on whether those reactions
differ with sufficient consistency to justify using the category of personal
property as a proxy for situations in which a claimant is unlikely to be
entitled to compensation under Michelman's scheme.
At first glance, it appears easy to reject such a suggestion. After all,
people are at least as subjectively attached to their personal property as
they are to their land. People's connections to deeply cherished items of
personal property, such as objects used in religious worship, photographs,
cars, wedding rings, or family heirlooms, .may match or exceed their
attachment to a piece of land. And, for the reasons discussed above
regarding liberty, people are as dependent upon personal property for
their material well being as they are upon land.

237. id. Michelman's theory has been described as a brilliant compromise between the
excessively constraining Pareto and the overly permissive Kaldor-Hicks measures of efficiency.
See FISCHEL, supra note 180, at 147-48.
238. See FISCHEL, supra note 180, at 144 ("The efficiency gains criterion is where economists
may be tempted to stop.").
239. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.

240.

See FISCHEL,supra note 180, at 145.
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The distinction between personal property and land, however, may
serve as a proxy for some other feature that has a significant impact on
demoralization costs. The most attractive candidate for such a feature is
value. As a general matter, demoralization costs arguably will track the
absolute value of an individual's monetary loss from a given government
regulation. Since an individual's holding in land (typically, her home) is
likely to be her single largest material asset,"1 a government action
affecting the value of that land is likely to have a larger effect on her
bottom line than government action affecting personal property. Thus,
the regulation of land is likely to generate more substantial
demoralization costs than regulation of personal property.
This version of the argument actually employs land as a proxy for a
proxy. First, it uses situations involving large monetary losses as proxies
for circumstances in which demoralization costs are high. Second, it treats
interests in land as proxies for situations involving large monetary losses.
On the basis of these combined proxies, the argument concludes that
heightened protection for all land is the best way to get at situations
involving high demoralization costs.
This argument has several problems at each step along the way. First,
if one's goal is to isolate claims involving takings of "expensive" parcels
of property, that is, claims involving regulations that impose large
monetary losses on property owners, then the obvious and most direct
way to accomplish this would be to establish a minimum amount in
controversy for regulatory takings claims. In other words, it is not clear
why any proxy for high demoralization costs is necessary.
Even assuming the desirability of such a proxy, the argument that
land should serve as the proxy for large demoralization costs because
land is most people's largest asset implicitly rests upon the rhetorical
power of the same paradigm of individual homeownership as the
"libertarian" argument from the American Dream. As a result, the
argument is subject to the same factual objections raised above.242 It is
true that the home is the biggest single piece of property owned by most
individuals, and that, as a consequence, interfering with a person's
enjoyment of that asset would likely generate enormous demoralization
costs.243 But this fact cannot justify the Court's sharp distinction between
land and other forms of property in regulatory takings law. As I have
already observed, residential property represents less than five percent of

241. See Arthur B. Kennickell, et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Results from
the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, in FED. RESERVE BULL., Jan. 2000, at 15 tbl.7, available

at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/buletin/2OOO/OOindex.htm (listing "primary residence" as
the largest "nonfinancial asset" for American families in 1998); see also Blume & Rubinfeld,

supra note 228, at 591-92.
242. See supra Part III.A.2.
243.

See supra note 241.
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all land in the United States and less than ten percent of all privately
of the
owned land.2 " Moreover, both the subjective and objective value
245
home extends well beyond the value of the land underlying it.
In addition to these factual objections, there are two broader
conceptual problems with using monetary value as a proxy for
demoralization costs. First, value, at least in an objective, monetary sense,
is an unreliable proxy for Michelman's demoralization costs.
"Demoralization" is a highly subjective measurement. Thus, an attempt
to use monetary value as a proxy for demoralization costs can only
succeed by ignoring the frequently unpredictable relationship between
the objective, monetary value of a piece of property and its ability to
generate subjective feelings of attachment. 246 The regulation of small
items of certain highly prized personal property, such as materials used in
religious worship, would predictably generate extremely high
demoralization costs. Similarly, the demoralization caused by the taking
of a small piece of land which has special emotional value (e.g., the
proverbial "family farm") would likely exceed the demoralization caused
by the taking of an equivalently sized piece of property whose owner
views it as completely fungible. Furthermore, the subjective attachment
most people feel towards "real" property is not directed solely toward the
land; it also encompasses the items of personal property attached to that
247

land.

More systematically, the notion that there is a decreasing marginal
subjective value to wealth suggests that the "proportional" value of
property (i.e., its value relative to a claimant's overall wealth) might be
more predictive of demoralization costs than its "absolute" monetary
value. In other words, even a large absolute loss might not generate
enormous demoralization costs for a person of great wealth. Conversely,
a much smaller loss might be devastating to a person for whom it
represents his life savings. Without a predictable relationship between
absolute monetary value and demoralization costs, the fact that items of
personal property may be on average less valuable than parcels of land is

244. See supra notes 197-198 and accompanying text.
245. See supra Part III.A.2.
246. To the extent that Michelman adheres to a purely utilitarian theory of property, he
must view such sentimental attachments as fully compensable. Of course, to non-utilitarians, the
ability to compensate for such sentimental property rests on highly questionable views about
commensurability. Indeed, the denial of such commensurability forms the basis for a dominant
species of argument against the cogency of utilitarianism as an ethical system. The utilitarian
countermove to this reference to sentimental value would be to say that sentimental
demoralization costs will normally generate high settlement costs. There are broad categories of
property, particularly property associated with family life, however, for which sentimental
demoralization costs will be predictably high and will, as a consequence, be roughly compensable
without generating unduly high settlement costs.
247. See supra Part III.A.
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not sufficiently predictive cf the outcome of the Michelman analysis to
justify a categorical distinction between personal property and land.
Even if objective monetary value were a good predictor for high
demoralization costs under Michelman's theory, the distinction between
personal property and land is a poor proxy for absolute monetary value.
As cases like Irving and Lorretto demonstrate, interests in land can be
nominal in value. 248 In contrast, a concentrated interest in personal
property, particularly a commercial interest-such as the one at issue in
Everard's Breweries-is normally quite substantial.249 Even at the

household level, valuable items of personal property, such as vehicles, can
account for a significant percentage
of a family's assets, particularly for
0
families that do not own a home.2
To summarize, the personal property/land distinction is, for the
purposes of the Michelman theory, a proxy on top of a proxy yielding an
overbroad conclusion. That is, it starts with the assertion that there is a
reliable correlation between the monetary value of property and the
subjective demoralization costs takings would generate. Second, it
depends upon the notion that the distinction between land and personal
property can serve as an adequate proxy for monetary value. Finally,
assuming the prior two assumptions to be sound, it concludes that
protecting all land as a category is a good way to protect most people's
largest assets (their homes) even though ninety percent of the protected
category of privately owned land is used for other purposes. When the
flaws in these assumptions are combined with the fact that there is no
apparent need for such a proxy (since an amount in controversy
requirement could be used instead), the attempt to ground the distinction
between personal property and land in Michelman's theory of
demoralization costs falls apart.
3.

Settlement Costs

Settlement costs will likely be higher when demoralization costs are
spread over a large number of individuals.251 Assuming personal property

248. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 713 (1987) (discussing one fractional share of land
worth just $.000418); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 445 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the New York Court of Appeals' conclusion that the
economic effect on the claimant of the regulation at issue was de minimis).
249. See, e.g., Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 556 (1924) (describing Everard's
loss as "heavy").
250. See id. (listing vehicles as accounting for, on average, 6.5% of the average family's
nonfinancial assets); see also Jacobs, Conclusion, supra note 199, at 247 (noting the highly
concentrated nature of landownership in the United States).
251. See Michelman, supra note 29, at 1223 (risks of unfairness are low when "burdens
similar to that for which compensation is denied are concomitantly imposed on many other
people (indicating that settlement costs are high and that those sustaining the burden are
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generally to consist of less valuable, more widely affordable and
standardized items, regulation of personal property seems more likely to
generate such a diffuse pattern of demoralization costs. Because high
settlement costs weigh against the need for compensation under
Michelman's theory, it might be argued that his theory favors a general
presumption against compensation for takings of personal property.
The first problem with this position, however, is that, as with
demoralization costs, the easiest and most direct way to filter out high
settlement costs is simply to create a minimum amount in controversy for
individual takings claims. Moreover, for the same reasons already
discussed in the context of demoralization costs, the distinction between
personal property and land is a flawed proxy for high settlement costs.
Big-ticket items of personal property, such as industrial equipment, or
concentrated commercial holdings of personal property are likely to be
less diffusely held than inexpensive items of personal property.
Compensation for the regulation of such categories of personal property,
which are likely to account for the bulk of personal property regulatory
takings claims, would not generate unusually high settlement costs. Thus,
Michelman's utilitarian theory provides scant support for the Court's
heightened protection of land over other forms of property.
D.

Takings and Public Choice

Public choice theories view the Takings Clause as a means of
protecting property holders from breakdowns in the rcpresentative
political process." 2 The "public choice" label encompasses a broad range
of theories about what constitutes failure in the political process. 3 This
discussion focuses on the particular application of public choice theory
that seems best suited to justify the Court's favoritism within regulatory
takings law towards property in land: the public choice theory of takings
advocated by William Fischel.
Fischel's theory is built around the notion that representative
government is disciplined by the ability of its constituents to exercise
rights of "voice" and "exit."'Z' 4 By "voice," Fischel means the ability to
influence the political process through participation, and by "exit," he
means the ability to vote with one's feet by moving out of the
jurisdiction. 5 In Fischel's view, landowners seeking to develop their
probably incurring relatively small net losses-else, being many, they probably could have been
mobilized to deflect the measure which burdens them)").
252. See FISCREL, supra note 180, at 277; Daniet A, Farber, Public Choice and Just
Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 306-308 (1992); Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and
Just Politics,22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 305-310 (1990); Treanor, supra note 133, at 866-67.
253. See Treanor, supra note 133, at 867.
254. FiSCHEL,supranote 180, at 134--39.
255. See id.
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property are vulnerable to majoritarian politics because they are usually a
numerical minority of the property holders in a jurisdiction."' 6 More
importantly, because land is fixed in place, owners of property subject to
a regulation imposed against their will may not have the option of
"exit[ing]" the jurisdiction and taking their land with them.257 In a
majoritarian setting, lacking the option of "exit" or "voice," landowners
seeking to develop their property will not be able to rely on the political
process giving adequate weight to their interests.25
According to Fischel, local governments are particularly majoritarian
in their decision-making. In this respect, they differ from larger
governmental units, which tend to be more pluralistic and therefore offer
a more hospitable environment to minority groups with substantial
resources." 9 Thus, Fischel concludes, while judges reviewing allegations
of regulatory takings should generally defer to the regulatory decisions of
state and federal governments, local government regulation of land use
should be scrutinized more closely under the Takings Clause than other
forms of government regulation'60
Fischel's analysis of landowners' supposed lack of an exit option
could support the Court's heightened protection for land. 61 Fischel
suggests that because land is always immobile owners of undeveloped
land will always be uniquely disadvantaged in a majoritarian system. 26 2 A
careful analysis of Fischel's premises, however, casts some doubt on such
a categorical understanding of his theory.
As Fischel himself points out, his theory depends upon the
immobility of regulated property to establish the absence of an exit
option. 263 Fischel sometimes seems to treat mobility or immobility as if it
were an all or nothing proposition: land is immobile, other property is not
necessarily so.2' Yet mobility is invariably a question of degree. While
land itself is certainly immobile, land uses and owners are often quite
256. See id. at 297.
257. See id. at 271, 285, 303, 331. Professor Been challenges Fischel's argument that the
owners of landed property have no exit options when dealing with local government. See Vicki
Been, "Exit" as a Constrainton Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the UnconstitutionalConditions
Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 531-33 (1991) (arguing that developers' ability to choose to
invest in less regulated communities amounts to an exit option).
258. See FIsCHEL, supra note 180, at 134-39.
259. See William A. Fischel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why is More Efficient
Regulation a Taking of Property? 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 865, 893 (1991). This "majoritarian"
view of local government has been challenged by Vicki Been. See Vicki Been, The Perils of
Paradoxes- Comment on William A. Fischel, "Exploring the Kozinksi Paradox: Why Is More
Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property?", 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 913, 920 (1991).
260. See FISCHEL, supra note 180, at 131-39, 303.
261. Indeed, Fischel himself sometimes seems to espouse such a view. See supra note 257.
262. See id. Owners of undeveloped land are not differently situated from any other
minority group with respect to "voice."
263. See id. at 303, 331.
264. See id. at 271, 285, 303, 331.
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mobile. 2" As Fischel acknowledges, a commercial developer denied
permission to build in one town, can vote with his feet by selling his
property and building in another jurisdiction. 2' Even an existing land
user zoned out of business in one location (for example, an adult
bookstore owner forced to leave a location as a result of zoning
regulations restricting the permissible locations for adult businesses) may
be able to move his business and dispose of his property in land to
someone desiring to engage in a non-restricted use. Thus, not every
regulation of land would trigger Fischel's heightened concerns. Rather,
the conditions justifying heightened scrutiny under Fischel's theory would
only seem to arise with a particular subset of land use regulations: those
that directly prevent the landowner from selling his property and moving
on by locking the landowner into a particular use, as certain types of rentcontrol statutes might do,267 or those that impose substantial costs on the
landowners' sale of property, as occurred in Lucas.
It might be argued that the sale of property is never an adequate
"exit" option because the restriction on land use that prompts the
landowner to flee will inevitably cause a decrease in the property's value.
But costs incurred in relocation are not unique to the owners of regulated
land. Any attempt to exit to a less regulated jurisdiction-even by moving
personal property-will impose CoStS. 2 8 Call such costs, "immobility
costs." For both personal property and land, these costs are not binary,
but are continuously variable in nature. For both types of owners,
immobility costs will consist of the total costs of moving either businesses,
personal property, or both to a less regulated jurisdiction.
In many cases, the immobility costs of avoiding regulation will be the
same, whether the regulation is styled as a land use regulation or a
regulation of personal property. For example, it is impossible to
differentiate between the immobility costs imposed upon an adult
bookstore forced to move to another jurisdiction because of a zoning
ordinance and one that is forced to move to another jurisdiction because
of a ban on the sale of adult books. 69
Immobility costs for landowners will not always be high. Indeed, it is
not even clear that they will usually be high. The immobility costs
265. See Been, supra note 257, at 532; Carol M. Rose, Book Review, Takings, Federalism,
Norms, 105 YALE L. 1121, 1133 (1996); Fischel, supra note 259, at 891.
266. See FISCHEL, supra note 180, at 303-04 ("Apartment owners in most other instances
vote against rent control by withholding new capital."); See also Fischel, supra note 259, at 891.
267. See FISCHEL,supranote 180, at 303-05.
268. See Baldwin Park Redevelopment Agency v. Irving, 156 Cal. App. 3d 428, 434 (1984)
(describing an auto wrecking operator whose inventory was reduced in value from $312,000 to
$50,000 after her business was shut down because the cost of moving the inventory to a new
location was prohibitively high).
269. The First Amendment considerations in such regimes may be somewhat different. See
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 53 (1986).
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imposed by a regulation on landowners, and therefore on the price of the
landowners' exit options, will depend on a variety of factors, including:
the nature of the regulation (does it proscribe existing uses or merely
prevent certain planned uses?); the identity of the landowner (is the
landowner someone with strong ties to the community and for whom a
location is non-fungible, or is the landowner a large corporation for
whom the regulated location is just a "dot on map"?); the identity of the
community (does it possess certain unique characteristics that make
relocation less attractive?); and the breadth of the restrictions imposed by
the regulation compared with the balance of remaining permissible
uses.

270

Conversely, as Fischel correctly acknowledges, the immobility costs
of personal property can easily be quite high. In some cases, they will
be magnified by the regulation itself. For example, during Prohibition, 27it2
was not only illegal to sell alcohol, it was illegal to transport it.
Similarly, the prohibition on the sale of eagle feathers in Andrus was
accompanied by an immobilizing prohibition on their export.273 Indeed, it
was precisely these legal immobilizations that led the prohibitions at issue
in Everard's Brewery and Andrus to deprive owners of alcohol and eagle
feathers of virtually all of their property's value. 74
There are other ways in which the immobility costs of property other
than land can increase such that its owners lack a viable means of
removing that property from the reach of local government regulation.
First, immobility costs can be increased because personal property is
connected to a particular location. This can occur, for example, when an
enterprise would go out of business if forced to sacrifice the goodwill it
has generated due to its longstanding operation in a particular location,
or when highly specialized equipment becomes useless when separated
from the location where it is used. 75 Second, immobility costs can
increase when, either because of the property's size or the distance to the

270. See Been, supra note 257, at 473, 539-43; Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among
Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions, 45 VAND. L. REV. 831, 858-67 (1992).
Indeed, in their nature and complexity, immobility costs appear to be quite similar to
Michelman's demoralization and settlement costs.
271. See FISCHEL, supra note 180, at 310-11 (discussing mobile homes).
272. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
273. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51,54 (1979).
274. See supra note 78. For owners of contraband property willing to break the law, that
property retained some residual value, but the costs to such owners (in terms of criminal, civil,
and moral sanctions) were correspondingly high.
275. See City of New York v. Atl. Terminal Renewal, 338 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1972) (large molds,
physically unconnected to the property-held to be compensable in a condemnation proceeding
because they had no value if removed from the property-holder's operations on the condemned
realty).
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less regulated market, the cost of moving the personal property to market
would be prohibitively high.276
It is difficult to see why, under Fischel's theory of voice and exit,
owners of personal property who incur immobility costs as a result of
local government regulation should be treated differently, in a categorical
way, than owners of land whose exit option is impeded by reductions in
the value of their real estate resulting from local land-use regulation.2 77 In
all cases, the value of the property owner's exit option will be inversely
proportional to the immobility costs he incurs in exercising it. It is this
cost to the owner, and not the nature of the underlying property, that
does the work in Fischel's analysis. And, as already discussed in the
context of Michelman's demoralization and settlement costs, a categorical
distinction between land and other forms of property adds little to a
direct focus on the "costs" (whatever name one wants to give them)
incurred by the owners of the regulated property in question."
Upon closer analysis, Fischel's theory has less to say about
differences between land and other forms of property than might initially
appear to be the case. Fischel's more important, though no less
controversial, observations relate to his contentions about the differences
between local government and other levels of government with respect to
the "voice" exercised by minorities in those polities. 79 But his theory
should not be read to support a strong distinction between personal
property and land within the law of regulatory takings.
E.

Takings and Thomistic Natural Law

The final perspective from which this Article analyzes the Court's
distinction between personal property and land is the Thomistic natural
law tradition. Although less frequently discussed in modern American
legal academic discourse, the Thomistic tradition, which draws heavily on
Aristotle's ethics, has exercised substantial influence on the development
of Western thinking about property law."0 The social theory of property
that emerges from Thomistic thought closely resembles the civic
republican tradition that many property scholars have identified as
276. See Baldwin Park Redevelopment Agency v. Irving, 156 Cal. App. 3d 428, 434 (1984);
see also supra note 78.
277. Cf id. at 540 (noting the dearth of "empirical evidence regarding who actually bears
the costs" of certain land-use regulation).
278. See supra Part III.C.
279. See Treanor, supra note 133, at 867. At best, Fischel's theory would justify heightened
judicial scrutiny of very narrow categories of local regulation, but any comprehensive list of such
narrow categories would necessarily include regulations affecting both land and personal
property.
280. See Eduardo Mois6s Pefialver, Redistributing Property: Natural Law, International
Norms, And The Property Reforms Of The Cuban Revolution, 52 FLA. L. REV. 107, 195-96
(2000).
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having a strong influence on this country's founding generation.28 '
Moreover, in recent years Thomistic natural law thinking has generated
renewed interest within the philosophy of law.2
Thomistic natural law reasoning revolves around the normative
notion of a shared human nature and the view that human actions and
'
institutions should seek to foster "human flourishing."283
Actions or
institutions that are utterly inconsistent with human flourishing violate
the natural law." But because, as John Finnis has observed, "the human
good is as multiple as human nature is complex," human flourishing can
be encouraged by a broad range of actions and institutional structures. 5
Positive law, the law of human communities, may either restate the
natural law or constrain individual choices within the broad outlines of

that natural law in order to pursue specific human goods." 6 But positive
law may not contravene natural law and must have as its principal goal
the pursuit of the "common good," 87 that is, the good of all members of
the community as equal human beings.2"
The Thomistic tradition views human nature as essentially social
and, consequently, posits community as a fundamental human
good.2 89Unlike the liberal tradition, which draws as the starting point for
its discussion of property rights the autonomous individual in the "state
of nature,""29 Thomistic thought begins its discussion of property rights
from the standpoint of the community already in existence.29'
281. See id. & n.496; see also ROSE, supra note 120, at 52, 61; see generally ALEXANDER,
supra note 156 (describing a persistent struggle in American property thought between liberal
and republican notions of property).
282.

See ANTHONY J. LISSKA, AQUINAS'S THEORY OF NATURAL LAW 8-12, 247-50 (1996)

(describing "renewed interest" in Thomistic natural law reasoning among legal philosophers).
283. See JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY (1998); LISSKA,
supra note 282, at 104-05. "Human flourishing" is a broad concept that, despite its connotation,
extends well beyond mere material well-being. See LISSKA, supra note 282, at 104-05 (noting
that, for Thomistic thinkers, "human flourishing" means "the functioning well of the essential
properties common to the individual in a specific natural kind.").
284. See FINNIS, supra note 283, at 139-40.
285. See FINNIS, supra note 283, at 140; see also ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF
NATURAL LAW 104 (1999) ("Of course, most of our choices are not between right and wrong
options, but rather between incompatible right options."); LISSKA, supra note 282, at 206 ("It is
important to realize that the conclusions of a theory of natural law in terms of what can be
justified are limited and moderate at best.").
286. See GEORGE, supra note 285, at 107-09.
287. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1-11, Q.96, a.l.
288. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 167-69 (1980).

289. See FINNIS, supranote 288, at 88, 143-44.
290. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-96 (Peter Laslett ed. 1967);
See NOZICK, supra note 28, at 3-25.
291. Aquinas's justification for private ownership presupposes the existence of a
community. In his discussion of private ownership in the Summa Theologiae, for example,
Aquinas observed that private ownership is the best way to make sure no one shirks his duties,
helps to avoid confusion as to who is responsible for what, and helps to maintain communal
peace. See AQUINAS, supra note 287, at I-Il, Q. 66, a.2; see also FINNIS, supra note 283, at 189
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In this respect, the Thomistic approach to property law is quite
similar to the social theory of property elaborated by such contemporary
property scholars as Joseph Singer and Eric Freyfogle 92 Their theories,
like Aquinas's, take as a foundational premise the fact that human beings
invariably live-and property rights only take on meaning-within a
community. Such a standpoint gives rise to a notion of property rights as
inherently limited by the robust demands of community life.293
Thomists acknowledge that community recognition of private
ownership, as a practical matter, may often yield material results for
acommunity that are superior to those generated by other forms of
ownership.294 Yet, because the justification for private ownership is
rooted in the common good, the property rights recognized within
Thomistic systems are necessarily subject to substantial social
limitation. 295 Thus, far from prohibiting government interference with
property rights, Thomism will, if anything, often affirmatively compel
such interference."9 Moreover, the Thomistic natural law tradition
generally views particular private property regimes not as a direct
product of natural law but rather as a permissible subject of positive
law."9 Human beings have a natural right, as against other human beings,
to the material possessions they need to survive and, to a lesser extent, to
flourish. So long as a property regime is directed towards the common
good and is consistent with these constraints, however, the natural law
permits a relatively wide array of particular property arrangements.29
In the specific context of takings law, the traditional natural law
understanding of property as an institution created by positive law and
subject to substantial communal control yields a permissive attitude
towards government expropriation. As Finnis has observed, Aquinas's
("The moral or juridical relationships to such an entity that we call property rights are
relationships to other people. They are matters of interpersonal justice .... Indeed, all the
justifications for appropriation of resources to particular owners (or holders of lesser property
rights) are based on 'general' justice, i.e., on the advantages which such appropriation is likely to
bring to all members of the community."). Each of these justifications only makes sense in the
context of a community of persons.
292. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON GOOD 16-17 (2003) ("[Tlhe rights of one landowner are necessarily constrained by the
rights

of

neighbors.");

JOSEPH

WILLIAM

SINGER,

ENTITLEMENT:

THE

PARADOXES

OF

PROPERTY 9 (2000) ("Owners do not live alone.... Because this is so, the institution of private
property inevitably raises questions about the character of social relations and the nature of
governance.").
293. See FREYFOGLE, supra note 292, at 16-17; SINGER, supra note 292, at 9.
294. See AQUINAS, supra note 287, at II-Il, Q. 66, a.2; FINNIS, supra note 283, at 189-90.
295. See FINNIS, supra note 283, at 190-96.
296. See id.
297. See AQUINAS, supra note 287, at II-II, Q. 66, a.2 ("The division of possessions is not
according to the natural law, but rather arose from human agreement, which belongs to positive
law").
298. See Pefialver, supra note 280, at 201-02.
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theory of property rights endorses an active role for the state in ensuring
a just distribution of property, even if that means taking property from
those with more and giving it to those with less.299 In a similar vein, other
Thomists have argued that expropriation of private property by the state
without compensation is consistent with the natural law.3"
The Thomistic tradition therefore would generally consider
questions concerning when the government must compensate for takings
of property to be primarily questions for positive law. At the margins,
however, the natural law would impose limits on the government's ability
to take its citizens' property. For example, it would not permit the state to
take a citizen's property without compensation when such a taking
deprived the citizen of the necessities of life or when, considered against
the background legal norms, it prevented that citizen from pursuing
human flourishing. Conversely, a natural law approach to property would
preclude a takings regime that was so protective of individual holdings of
property that it prevented the government from forcibly redistributing
property in order to provide for the necessities of its poorer citizens.
Within these parameters, the natural law would generally allow a
community to determine for itself the level of protection it would grant to
private property against takings, regulatory or otherwise.
Consequently, for the Thomistic property theorist, the question
whether land should be granted heightened protection under the doctrine
of regulatory takings would frequently reduce to an analysis of the
relevant positive legal authorities. Natural law would only have some
bearing on the justifiability of such a distinction if there were some
reason to believe that the uncompensated regulatory taking of land
would be more likely to deprive an individual of the necessities of life or
to prevent human flourishing.
There might be societies in which the importance of land is such that
its deprivation constitutes a grave interference with a person's ability to
survive or flourish. Such concerns might arise, for example, in a society of
subsistence farmers with little or no social welfare system. Whether or
not such circumstances ever predominated in this country, it is
undoubtedly the case that our current situation bears little resemblance
to such an agrarian society.3 1 In our modern urban (or suburban) culture,
the suggestion that private landownership is uniquely essential to human
survival or flourishing in a way not shared with other forms of property is

299.

See FINNIS, supra note 283, at 195; see also AQUINAS, supra note 287, at I-II, Q. 66, a.

7.

300. See FRANCISCO SUAREZ, DE LEGIBUS, bk. I, ch. ix, para. 3 (1612), reprinted in
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (James Brown Scott ed. 1944).
301. See supra notes 181-182 and accompanying text.
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not credible.3 °2 Thus, the broad prescriptions of natural law theory fail to
provide much affirmative support for the Supreme Court's favoritism
towards land as a form of property.
VI.

THE COURT'S UNJUSTIFIED FAVORITISM TOWARD LAND AS A REASON FOR

REJECTING THE LUCAS RULE

Despite the weak intellectual foundations for a distinction between
land and personal property in regulatory takings law, the modern Court's
regulatory takings jurisprudence undoubtedly has been characterized by
favoritism towards land.3" 3 What has caused the Court to persist in such
favoritism despite the weak normative basis underlying its distinction?
One possibility is that the land preference reflects a convenient
convergence between the intuitively appealing (though ultimately
unfounded) notion that landownership is more important than other
forms of property, and the specific self-interested concerns of the
property-rights movement, "° with which the conservative majority of the
Court appears to sympathize."'
Several scholars have argued that the Supreme Court's regulatory
takings revival is firmly rooted in the conservative political movement.3"6
The Court's distinction between personal property and land may offer
further evidence of these ideological roots. In its favoritism towards
property in land, the Court's doctrine closely mirrors the land-focused
political rhetoric of the property-rights movement.3 7 Viewed in this light,
the distinction makes perfect sense: it has allowed the Court to strike
down the regulations that most trouble it (primarily environmental
regulations affecting land), while leaving for another day the
"innumerable" economic regulations affecting the value of personal
property.3"' In seeking to keep its Lucas rule (and, arguably, its regulatory
takings doctrine as a whole) within the relatively narrow bounds of land
use regulation, the Court, or at least its "property rights" majority, can be
understood as exhibiting a pragmatic desire to limit the scope of its own

302. See Geisler, supra note 128, at 542 (observing the declining importance of land "as a
factor of production, social status, and basis of wealth" in modern society).
303. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 201-207 and accompanying text.
305. See OLIVErri & WORSHAM, supra note 197, at 71 ("While one can identify a propertyrights bloc-Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Thomas-it is harder to identify a
lasting, clearly enunciated, property rights rationale that ties the voting bloc together.").
306. See Lazarus, supra note 12, at 1413-15; Kendall & Lord, supra note 201, at 510-12.
307. See supra notes 201-207 and accompanying text.
308. See Sugameli, supra note 12, at 986 (explaining the distinction as a means of allowing
the Court to find a taking in Lucas without calling into question "the innumerable instances
where regulations destroy all value and use of personal property").
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potentially far-reaching regulatory- takings doctrine to the core set of
cases that, for political reasons, it finds most troubling.3'
No matter how superficially appealing it might seem, however, a
sharp distinction between personal property and land in the regulatory
takings context is not justified. Whatever its motives, the Court's effort to
cabin the implications of its own expansion of regulatory takings law
amounts to little more than an ipse dixit. The Court cannot, by simply
waving its hands, avoid taking the bad with the good. In the Lucas
context, for example, it should either apply the Lucas rule across the
board to both personal property and land, or it should reject the Lucas
doctrine altogether.
Between these two choices-Lucas expanded to cover personal
property, or no Lucas rule at all-the preferable option is clearly the
rejection of the Lucas per se rule. The parade of horribles presented by
Justice Stevens in his Lucas dissent provides a compelling argument that
the results of the diminution-in-value rule simply do not match most
people's intuitions about the government's ability to regulate property.3 10
Justice Stevens was undoubtedly correct that the Lucas rule, if applied
consistently, would severely hinder the government's ability to regulate
the economy in ways that historically have been uncontroversial.3 '
Extending the Lucas rule to personal property would undoubtedly
constitute a substantial shift in the understanding of the Takings Clause.
Indeed, even the most laissez faire of courts has refused to employ
takings law to require compensation for total deprivations of economic
value resulting from regulation of personal property. At the height of the
Lochner"2 era, the Court repeatedly affirmed the power of the state to
ban commerce in alcohol, without considering the effect of such bans on
the economic value of those goods or the applicability of "background
'
principles"313
of state law, such as the common law of nuisance.3 4 Such
309. Of course, in Eastern Enterprises, a subset of the Court's property-rights wing
expressed an eagerness to employ its regulatory takings doctrine to invalidate a statute that had
nothing to do with land use. Tellingly, however, the coalition that stood behind the Court's
modem regulatory-takings doctrine found itself unable to hold together in that case, with Justice
Kennedy defecting from the plurality's Takings Clause analysis in favor of a Due Process
rationale. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part) ("Our cases do not support the plurality's conclusion that the
Coal Act takes property.").
310. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1068 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
311. See id. These dramatic effects of an across-the-board application of Lucas's diminutionin-value test are unaffected by the Court's recent scaling back of the Lucas rule in Tahoe-Sierra.
See supra note 81.
312. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
313. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-30 (stating that a law that deprives a property owner of all
economically beneficial use of the land is not a taking if it merely replicates limitations on the
owner's ability to use the land contained within "background principles of nuisance and property
law").
314. See supra note 86.
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regulations almost invariably destroyed all economic value of the goods
for those left with large quantities on hand.31 Nevertheless, as the Court
indicated on several occasions, they did not constitute the "appropriation
of private property" without compensation in violation of the Takings
Clause but instead represented "merely a lessening in value due to a
'
permissible restriction."316
The category of regulations that would deprive an owner of all
economically beneficial use of personal property extends well beyond
prohibitions of alcohol. The government has frequently banned
commerce in items even where the use of such items would not violate
"background principles" of state law as that notion was understood by
the Lucas Court. Recreational drugs, for example, were banned largely
for moral, political, and sometimes racial reasons, without regard to their
status as "nuisances." '17 Few would argue, however, that the government
should have to pay compensation when banning, for whatever the reason,
recreational drugs that might be developed in the future.
Moreover, even government regulation that falls far short of outright
prohibition may eliminate the value of personal property. For example,
when the FDA refuses to approve a drug for human medical use, it can
eliminate the value of both tangible stocks of the drug and the intellectual
property behind it.31 Few would argue that such routine regulatory
conduct gives rise to a valid claim for compensation by affected propertyholders.
A takings doctrine that required the state to compensate owners of
personal property for the consequences of such routine government
regulation would constitute a radical reconceptualization of our system of
government as it has existed for over two centuries. The Lucas Court's
apparent discomfort with the implications of its deprivation-of-value test
for personal property is therefore unsurprising, as is its accompanying
attempt to reach for an unprincipled distinction between land and other
forms of property to avoid having to extend that rule to its logical
stopping point.

315. See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1151.
316. Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 303 (1920); see also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65
(1979): Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 563 (1924).
317. See, e.g., James Ostrowski, The Moral and PracticalCase for Drug Legalization, 18
HOFSTRA L. REV. 607, 612-15 (1990) (noting that "drug prohibition was not originally based on
careful analysis and research"); Kurt L. Schmoke, An Argument in Favor of Decriminalization,
18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 501, 507-08 (1990) (1875 ordinance closing Chinese opium dens in San
Francisco "not passed out of any concern for addiction, but out of a concern that Chinese opium
dens were being frequented by white women and men of 'good family").
318. See, e.g., Justin Gillis, ImClone CEO, Chairman Step Down, WASH. POST, Apr. 30,
2003, at El (noting the direct connection between rumors concerning FDA approval of a
company's cancer drug and the value of the company's stock).
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Indeed, the Court's apparent discomfort, and the reasons behind it,
provides a strong argument that there is a fundamental problem with the
Lucas per se analysis. The Lucas majority has already indicated that it
believes its diminution-in-value test is not an appropriate means for
determining when a particular regulation of personal property has
become a taking. If the Lucas majority itself thought that its diminutionin-value rule was too blunt an instrument to distinguish reliably between
permissible and impermissible regulation of property (properly
understood as including personal property), that acknowledgement is a
good reason for rethinking Lucas's per se rule altogether.
Indeed, the Court's narrowing of the Lucas rule in Tahoe Sierra may
well reflect a growing discomfort with the implications of the per se Lucas
rule. But even the Lucas rule as narrowed by Tahoe Sierra would
constitute a radical departure from prior practice if extended to cover
personal property. In light of the unprincipled nature of the Court's
refusal to extend Lucas to personal property, and the confusion its
distinction between land and personal property has generated among the
lower courts it is apparent that the Court's decision in Tahoe Sierra does
not go far enough to limit the impact of the Lucas rule. The Court should
go the distance and make clear that Lucas is no longer good law.319
In light of the confusion surrounding much of the Court's regulatory
takings jurisprudence, the desire for bright line standards, such as Lucas's
diminution-in-value rule or its personal property exception, is
understandable. 31 Contrary to Professor Rose-Ackerman's contention
that virtually "any consistent, publicly articulated approach [to regulatory
32 adopting the wrong bright line standard
takings] is better than none,""
can easily do as much harm as continuing to muddle along with the broad
and flexible standards of Penn Central. Lucas demonstrates the danger of
choosing the wrong rigid rules in this area of law. Applied consistently to
takings of both land and personal property, Lucas's diminution-in-value
rule would prevent local, state, and national governments from engaging
in regulatory activities that have been universally accepted as
constitutionally uncontroversial.322
Per se rules adopted solely for the sake of increasing clarity and
predictability are not the answer. Indeed, as Marc Poirier has argued,
there may be very good reasons for the persistent murkiness of the
standards for finding a regulatory taking.323 Regulatory takings claims
319. See supra Part I.C.
320. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
321. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 6, at 1711.
322. See Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 303 (1920); Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S.
545, 563 (1924); Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1151.
323. See Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L.
REV. 93, 100, 190-91 (2002).
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often simultaneously implicate questions of basic fairness, distributive
justice, utility and efficiency, an individual's ability to rely on settled
expectations in pursuit of life plans, and society's need to regulate private
activity for the sake of health, safety and the preservation of the
environment for future generations. These diverse considerations suggest
that it will be the rare bright line test that can consistently do justice
across a broad array of takings cases. The much-maligned balancing test
3 4
set forth in Penn Central provides the needed flexibility. " Whether the
vague factors outlined in that case are the right ones is subject to
debate." 5 But the Court's ad hoc approach in Penn Central gives judges
ample room to weigh the competing values typically implicated in takings
cases.

32 6

As is the case in the specific context of the Lucas rule, it is
reasonable to think that the modern Court's focus on land has made its
takings revival, as a whole, considerably more palatable. 2 ' Because of the
general favoritism towards land in the regulatory takings area, fewer oxen
have been gored by judicial invalidations of regulations during the
Court's expansion of regulatory takings law over the past two decades.
To the extent that this has been the case, the unprincipled nature of that
favoritism towards land provides an argument for reconsidering that
expansion altogether. Deprived of the crutch of its artificially narrow
focus on land use, the Court might well find that it prefers a less robust
regulatory takings doctrine.
CONCLUSION

Neither the historical treatment of property, the differences in
expectations cited by the Court in Lucas, nor the examined normative
theories of property and takings supports a sharp distinction between
land and personal property in regulatory takings law. To the extent that
this conclusion conflicts with vague intuitions about the primacy of
property in land, those intuitions are most likely rooted in cultural
assumptions based on outmoded notions of the ways in which most
people use land. The image of the self-sufficient "yeoman farmer" is one
such outdated concept. Alternatively, those intuitions may be based upon
legitimate beliefs about the importance of a particular type of land use:
ownership of one's dwelling. As argued here, however, the work done by

324.
325.
326.

See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
See DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, TAKINGS 121-68 (2002).
Cf Poirier, supra note 323, at 190-91 (defending vagueness in regulatory takings

analysis).
327. See Byrne, supra note 17, at 127-28 (arguing that, applying the regulatory takings
doctrine to "assets other than land" would "approach denying the legitimacy of legislation tout

court," something that the Supreme Court has shown no interest in doing); McUsic, supra note
17, at 653-58.
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landownership in generating the symbolic and emotional importance of
homeownership, while real, is generally overstated. Furthermore,
protecting land to protect homeownership is vastly over-inclusive.
Deprived of an artificially narrow focus on land use regulation, both the
Court's Lucas rule and its expanded regulatory takings doctrine as a
whole are far more radical in their implications and, as a consequence, far
less appealing.
Despite frequent pleas by scholars for the introduction of bright line
tests into the law of regulatory takings, this is an area of law particularly
ill-suited to such inflexible standards. Per se rules, like the one adopted
by the Court in Lucas, will often be incapable of giving adequate weight
to the broad range of interests implicated by takings claims. Far from
being a sign of sickness, the Court's historical reluctance to adhere to
rigid standards in the law of regulatory takings may reflect an attempt to
give judges the room necessary to do justice in this challenging area of
law.

